Clearly, there is a lot of interest in what the RISE Centre can provide, but there is also a lot of pressure and expectation. The immediate response, however, is that we can do this. RISE is a centre that is about thinking about ideas, where the process of determining the nature of those ideas is often more important than the outcome per se — although impact and further scholarly development are always on the mind of those producing in such a setting. But the RISE Centre is not just about thinking about ideas; it is also about doing things, making things happen, getting things done. This is where the RISE Centre is the bridge, in a very difficult environment, between academics who seemingly understand everything but know nothing, and policymakers who know everything but understand nothing.

This is where the concept of radicalisation is also right at the heart of what the Centre is trying to do. In my own work, I have tried to invert the concept so that it is seen as a positive contributor to society, where "radical" means an individual, group or movement that is built on change for the betterment of society as a whole. Sometimes this means revolution; at other times it means evolution.

The RISE Centre is a ground-up initiative aimed at breaking up the consensus operating in the very small spaces that exist for such a discourse to take hold, given the dominance of the state-centric security paradigms that are very much part of the characteristics of our field itself. And so we operate in a way that challenges the hegemonic framing by arguing that to be radical is a good thing — as long as it does not necessarily lead to political violence — but this will require subtle interpretation and application in a space that is often constricted. This is where freedom of opinion and expression are also important, to maintain a grip on what we can achieve without being marked as the potential creators of negative radicalisation itself, while we seek to present radicalisation in its current form as the reality of defunct public policy, social policy, or counter-terrorism policy that can often make things worse.

This opens up so many issues, and we cannot begin to start fixing all of them. That is why cooperation, coordination and collaboration are key, so that we can carry out our small and important interventions in robust, realistic chunks. We can carry out research, we can organise events, we can engage in debates, we can hold roundtables; our links with the civil society sector are therefore important. We cannot ignore the wider issues in relation to the class system and racial injustice that sit at the heart of some of the problems we think about when we think about radicalisation today, such that we are dealing with a

multifaceted, intersectional dynamic that is local and global in the making and in the shaping.

In the end, the RISE Centre is a University centre, but one where communities are not an afterthought but very much an essential defining piece — because we research communities, we research communities with them and for them, not just on them. It is a long road ahead, and one where we will always potentially be climbing uphill. Any wins that we gain will probably be very small, but particularly significant and useful in the long run.

When we think about Birmingham, we have got to think about minorities, but we have also got to think about majorities. Yet we should not think about them as separate cases, but rather as the same set of challenges facing two sets of groups that are almost mirror images of each other. Poverty, disadvantage, exclusion, disenfranchisement, alienation and marginalisation limit the opportunities for real, true and meaningful talent to be realised. Some of these issues, which impact on people's ability to make meaningful contributions to the social world, mean that these vacuums can be weaponised and turned into political manoeuvring that seeks to placate failed policy more generally, and to redirect, misdirect and mislead vulnerable individuals into seeking out solutions wholly in problematic terms — such as ethno-nationalism — misframing immigration and minority discourses as somehow at the heart of their own issues, which is entirely untrue and has no basis in science whatsoever.

There is talent and opportunity in both minorities and majorities, and we need to recognise it, because the city as a whole is an immense space and a laboratory for our understanding of issues of economic development, spatial identity politics, and the roles of housing policy and housing markets in creating and fomenting racialised and minoritised, segregated communities who live apart from each other — not by choice, but through a lack of choice. And then, due to national politics, their frustrations are vented towards their unfamiliar neighbours, who are presented as alien, undesirable, or highly threatening to the rest of us. This is an unfortunate consequence of populism and authoritarianism and all of the implications that it raises. The differences between individuals and groups need not be differences between communities; we need to see them as experiencing differentiated needs within the same set of challenges. This is what we need to do to reframe radicalisation — not as a problem of individuals, but as a societal issue.

At the heart of much of this analysis, the focus is on the economy, which includes labour markets and education — i.e. the transformation of capital — but also what this means for social relations between groups who have different

access to different degrees of capital, which ultimately materialises in different forms of cultural capital, and ultimately in the political mobilisation that comes with interest groups coming together *or* coming apart. In the post-war period, so much has changed and developed in the city of Birmingham, which remains Europe's largest local authority and its youngest city, but it has considerable inequality. This division can be exacerbated in the light of ongoing issues more generally, where the world and our nation are more unequal, more unfair, more polarised, more extreme, more radicalised, and more indifferent to each other than ever before.

This has to be reversed, so that we can reveal policies and practices that are indeed progressive, inclusive, just, ethical and equitable. This is why it is never possible to see extremism in a vacuum; it is often an outcome of much wider social, political, economic and cultural relations. And whichever part of the world we are in, it is the same set of framing issues that come to the fore time and time again. While this framing perhaps suggests we are dealing with so much more complexity, it also means that we can only focus on what we conceivably can achieve, asking us to prioritise, organise and synthesise ways forward — because only together can we rise, and rise together we shall.

I just want to say a major thanks to everyone here at the conference for the contributions that everyone has made, but also for the facilitation, organisation and implementation. My colleagues on the foundation of the Centre have been so willing to take time out to support this venture. Every single speaker said something meaningful and engaging; we spoke to each other in ways that conferences on these themes often never do. We do not have all the answers, but we have plenty of questions, and we are not afraid of having uncomfortable conversations. This is how we will make progress.

Today marks the beginning of the formal recognition of the Institute. It is a starting point — it is the first rung on the ladder — but we have much more to climb. Together we will climb on this journey and rise above all that fails individuals, communities, neighbourhoods, families, cities and nations: through research, through engagement, through policy and practice, and ultimately through empowerment of those who often have the least but also often have the most to offer, yet remain misrecognised, invisible, and potentially vulnerable. This is the key issue at the heart of this Centre — to prevent and eliminate radicalisation in all its forms.