

DRIVE

Resisting Radicalisation Through Inclusion

Major Conference Report

Deliverable 7.2

Author: Tahir Abbas



This project has received funding from the European Union's H2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 959200.

Project information

DRIVE project information	
Grant agreement number	959200
Project full title	Determining multi-level led causes and testing intervention design to reduce radicalisation, extremism and political violence in north-western Europe through social inclusion.
Project acronym	DRIVE
Funding scheme	H2020 Research and Innovations Actions (RIA)
Start date of the project	1 January 2021
Duration	42 months: 1 January 2021 – 30 June 2024
Project website	https://www.driveproject.eu/

History of changes

Version	Publication date	Author	Description of change
1.0	16-06-2024	Tahir Abbas	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Initial draft
1.1	17-06-2024	Tahir Abbas	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Final version
1.2	24-06-2024	Tahir Abbas	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Final version after insertions from the PMH team
1.3	26-06-2024	Tahir Abbas	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Finalisation and submission

Contents

Project information	1
History of changes.....	1
1. Executive Summary	3
2. Introduction	3
Background on the DRIVE Project and its aims:	3
Rationale and goals for the conference	3
Target audience	4
Conference logistics	5
3. Day 1: Unravelling the Nexus	5
Welcome and opening remarks	5
Keynote speech on radicalisation and social exclusion:	6
Panel 1: DRIVE findings by country:.....	7
Summary of key points and discussions from Day 1:	16
4. Day 2: Bridging Research and Policy.....	16
Panel 2: Public mental health consequences of social exclusion:	16
Panel 3: Findings on far right and nationalist groups:	19
Panel 4: Findings on Muslim communities and government relations:.....	22
Panel 5: Translating research into policy impact:.....	24
Summary of key points and discussions from Day 2:	24
5. Outcomes and Insights.....	25
Main takeaways and conclusions from the conference:.....	25
Conceptual and theoretical advances:	25
Strengthened networks and collaborations:.....	25
6. Notes and Observations Based on Perspectives from the Audience	26
7. Moving forward.....	28

1. Executive Summary

The DRIVE Project, funded by the European Commission and coordinated by Leiden University, recently concluded its groundbreaking 42-month investigation into the interplay between social exclusion and radicalisation across the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom. To disseminate the project's findings and insights, a major international conference was held on 11-12 June 2024 at the Stanhope Hotel in Brussels. The conference brought together 80 leading scholars, policymakers, practitioners, and members of community groups to critically examine the multifaceted relationships between social exclusion, alienation, and extremism. Our intention for the conference was to provide a space for discussion and advancement of evidence-based policies and strategies that can contribute to the building of resilient and inclusive societies. Key topics focused on at the conference included the DRIVE project's country-specific findings, the public mental health consequences of social exclusion, insights into far-right and nationalist groups, the dynamics of Muslim communities and government relations, and the translation of academic research into policy impact. The conference fully achieved its goals of advancing conceptual frontiers, bridging disciplinary silos, amplifying marginalised voices, equipping policymakers with robust recommendations, and forging enduring networks for collaboration. The outcomes underscored the urgent need for holistic, interdisciplinary approaches to confronting radicalisation through proactive social inclusion strategies at the local, national, and European levels.

2. Introduction

Background on the DRIVE Project and its aims:

The DRIVE (Determining the Role of social Inclusion and social Vulnerability in radicalisation and Extremism) Project is a groundbreaking initiative funded by the European Commission's H2020 Research and Innovation Actions programme. Coordinated by Leiden University in The Hague, the project aimed to investigate social exclusion and radicalisation in the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom over a 42-month period. By situating radicalisation within broader societal dynamics, the project sought to challenge prevailing assumptions and illuminate the urgent need for holistic, interdisciplinary approaches to understanding and addressing extremism.

Rationale and goals for the conference

The DRIVE Project culminated in an international conference that brought together a diverse array of stakeholders, including eminent scholars, policymakers, practitioners, and community groups, to disseminate the project's findings and forge new pathways for understanding and addressing the relationship between social exclusion and radicalisation. The conference aimed to unveil groundbreaking evidence on the

understudied linkages between these phenomena across the four focus countries, pushing the boundaries of conceptual and theoretical understanding by interrogating the multifaceted roles of ideological, political, and socioeconomic factors in shaping radicalisation processes. By bridging disciplinary silos and fostering interactive engagement through panels, roundtables, one keynote speech, and informal networking, the conference sought to fortify emerging best practices and amplify marginalised voices, recognising the vital role of impacted communities as partners in co-creating context-sensitive and empowering solutions.

The conference also served as a platform to equip policymakers with robust, research-backed recommendations for crafting proactive inclusion agendas that mitigate vulnerability to extremist narratives, underscoring the importance of evidence-based approaches in informing effective policy responses. Moreover, the conference aimed to establish long-lasting networks of inspiration and collaboration, acting as launching pads for future research, practice, and advocacy initiatives in the field. By bringing together a diverse range of perspectives and expertise, the conference sought to catalyse new synergies and spark innovative approaches to tackling the complex challenges posed by social exclusion and radicalisation, ultimately contributing to the development of more inclusive, resilient, and cohesive societies.

Target audience

The conference brought together a diverse assembly of 80 attendees, representing a wide range of expertise and experiences in the fields of radicalisation, extremism, social exclusion, community engagement, and conflict studies. Academics specialising in these areas were present, bringing their cutting-edge research and theoretical insights to bear on the challenges at hand. Policymakers involved in shaping prevention and integration strategies at local, national, and European levels also attended, seeking to inform their work with the latest evidence and best practices. European-level police officers engaged in counterterrorism and countering violent extremism (CT-P/CVE) efforts were also present, bringing their operational expertise and insights from the frontlines to enrich the discussions.

Alongside these groups, the conference welcomed practitioners who engage directly with communities affected by radicalisation, such as social workers, educators, and community leaders. These individuals brought valuable grassroots perspectives and practical experiences to the table, highlighting the importance of context-sensitive approaches and the need for empowering, community-driven solutions. Civil society organisations, charities, and community groups challenging extremism and advocating for social inclusion and resilience strategies were also present, underscoring the vital role of non-governmental actors in addressing these issues. The diversity of attendees at the conference reflected the multifaceted nature of the challenges posed by radicalisation and social exclusion, and the need for collaborative, interdisciplinary approaches to tackling these issues effectively.

Conference logistics

The conference was held on 11-12 June 2024 at the Stanhope Hotel in Brussels, Belgium. The five-star venue, situated between the European quarter and the Royal Palace, provided an ideal setting for the event. The conference programme spanned two full days, with registration and a welcome reception on the evening of 11 June, followed by a full day of panels, roundtables, and networking opportunities on 12 June.

3. Day 1: Unravelling the Nexus

Welcome and opening remarks

The conference commenced with opening remarks and housekeeping announcements by Inés Bolaños Somoano from Leiden University. Professor Tahir Abbas, also from Leiden University, then delivered an introduction reflecting on the DRIVE Project's journey, highlighting the advances made, challenges encountered, and opportunities for future research and collaboration.

The European Commission funded the groundbreaking 42-month DRIVE Project, shedding light on the relationship between social exclusion, identity, and polarisation among individuals and communities in the Netherlands, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Norway. Led by Professor Tahir Abbas of Leiden University, the project brought together a diverse consortium of 30 colleagues from five countries, including nine dedicated post-doctoral researchers. Through a comprehensive mixed-methods approach, the project conducted 417 in-depth interviews, surveyed 5,501 respondents, held 14 focus groups, and carried out over 30 event observations. The findings revealed a pervasive sense of stigmatisation, discrimination, and othering experienced by many participants, particularly those from Muslim backgrounds and ethnic majority communities who felt left behind by rapid social and economic changes.

The project's theoretical framework, grounded in sociology, criminology, social psychology, political science, and public mental health, focused on the concept of "enabling factors"—the interplay of individual, interpersonal, and structural factors that can create conditions conducive to polarisation and exclusion. The researchers adopted a holistic, intersectional, and context-specific approach to provide nuanced insights and challenge simplistic assumptions and dominant narratives. The comparative nature of the project highlighted both similarities and differences in how exclusion and polarisation manifest across the four countries. All contexts highlighted the salient issues of national identity, belonging, and the place of minority communities, yet the framing and mobilisation of these issues varied, reflecting different histories of migration, post-colonialism, and nation-building. Integrating a public mental health perspective, the project assessed the symptoms and resilience levels of young people interviewed to correlate with their reported lived experiences of social exclusion and alienation. The results of the interviews and subsequent focus group discussions informed the design and feasibility testing of a brief pilot 'intervention' that operationalised the IC-ADAPT model to promote resilience with a wider range of

response choices to inform efforts at prosocial change among the ‘intervention’ participants. The project’s findings have significant policy implications, emphasising the need for a multi-level approach to address the root causes of exclusion and polarisation. Recommendations include promoting inclusive and equitable policies, investing in education and youth empowerment, engaging with affected communities, and strengthening community partnerships and collaborations.

Professor Abbas concluded by expressing gratitude to the funders, partners, collaborators, and participants who made the research possible. He acknowledged the deleterious impacts that the COVID-19 global pandemic has had on wider societal feelings of alienation and marginalization among certain individuals and groups. Professor Abbas also highlighted some of the more specific recruitment and methodological challenges of conducting research during periods of lockdown and social withdrawal. Despite the difficulties of this period for those conducting social research, the DRIVE Project has successfully generated valuable insights and recommendations that have the potential to contribute to building a more just, inclusive, and peaceful future for all. The project’s findings serve as a call for holistic, initiative-taking interventions that address the root causes of exclusion and polarisation, rather than characterising specific individuals or communities as potential radicals. As the project ends, Professor Abbas emphasises that the present constitutes the beginning of an extended dissemination process, with ongoing efforts to extract the maximum value from the wealth of data collected. He expressed confidence that the project’s insights will have a lasting impact on research, policy, and practice and looked forward to rich and engaging discussions on the implications of the findings over the next two days of the conference.

Keynote speech on radicalisation and social exclusion:

In her keynote speech, Professor Alison Scott-Baumann from SOAS University of London discusses her research on the relationships between Muslims, government, education, and politics in the context of growing tensions and concerns about extremism in the UK. She emphasizes the importance of having the freedom to speak, think, and express oneself clearly to foster better understanding and the ability to disagree. Professor Scott-Baumann’s research combines micro (individual), meso (group), and macro (governmental) perspectives to identify tensions and discrepancies between policy and practice. She highlights the challenges posed by counter-terrorism legislation to the right to think, speak, and disagree, particularly for Muslims. The liberal values that advocate for difference and protect mutual cohabitation in public life are paradoxically diminished when individual rights are seen to trump collective interactions. The speech outlines several research projects undertaken by Professor Scott-Baumann, including:

1. AMSCITT (1998-2002): A school-centred initial teacher training scheme in collaboration with British Muslim colleagues and the Association of Muslims Schools.

2. Research on Muslim faith leadership training (2008-10): Commissioned by the New Labour government to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of training provisions for imams and scholars in the UK, identify gaps, and explore collaborative initiatives between Muslim faith leadership training providers and mainstream education institutions.

3. Re/presenting Islam on campus (2015-19): The first comprehensive academic study on the contested nature of religion and belief on campus, focusing on the experiences of Muslim staff and students in UK universities and Islamic colleges.

4. Universities and Muslim Seminaries Project (2019): Commissioned by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) to identify barriers to Islamic theological institutes achieving higher education accreditation and improve Muslim girls and women's higher education opportunities.

5. New everyday practices of free speech on campus (2021-2024): A project aimed at addressing systemic racial and ethnic discrimination in higher education and facilitating constructive discussions on campuses

Professor Scott-Baumann also introduces the concept of “Influencing the Corridors of Power” (ICOP), an activist citizen politics approach inspired by the work of Jane Addams. ICOP aims to initiate open conversational episodes that build reciprocity among those who habitually avoid each other, such as civil servants and Muslim citizens. The three impact objectives of ICOP are to improve policy making with independent expertise, forge connections between academia and Westminster, and create spaces for deliberative democracy for underrepresented civil society voices.

Despite setbacks and challenges, Professor Scott-Baumann remains committed to engaging with Westminster and has established an All-Party Parliamentary Group on Communities of Inquiry to bring together state actors and civil society protagonists to discuss political issues, policy matters, Islam, and the secular state. Through her research and the work of ICOP, she seeks to promote change by identifying issues, commissioning briefings, and involving students and experts in the policy-making process.

Panel 1: DRIVE findings by country:

Moderated by Associate Professor Nadia Fadil from KU Leuven, the first panel explored the DRIVE Project's findings across the four focus countries. Presenters included:

- Tahir Abbas (Leiden University) on the Netherlands
- Mark Sedgwick (Aarhus University) on Denmark
- Eolene Boyd-MacMillan (University of Cambridge) and Gabe Mythen (University of Liverpool) on the United Kingdom
- Valerie DeMarinis (Oslo University, Umeå University, and Innlandet Hospital Trust) on Norway

Each presenter shared key insights, trends, and contextual factors shaping the dynamics of social exclusion and radicalisation in their respective countries. The panel discussion highlighted both commonalities and divergences across the four contexts, underscoring the need for nuanced, locally-grounded approaches to understanding and addressing extremism.

Professor Abbas explored the Dutch findings. The DRIVE Project's findings for the Netherlands provide a nuanced understanding of the dynamics of social exclusion and radicalisation in the context of a shifting political landscape. The qualitative data analysis reveals that Muslim minorities face significant levels of discrimination and marginalisation in various domains of life, including the labour market, public spaces, and social media. The perceived incompatibility of Muslim religious identity with Dutch national identity often ties these experiences of exclusion, highlighting the challenges individuals face in navigating multiple identities and the pressure to prove their loyalty and integration into Dutch society. The politicisation of Islam and the framing of Muslim minorities as a threat to Dutch values have contributed to the polarisation of society and the legitimisation of exclusionary practices. Muslim respondents discussed the lack of recognition and representation of their experiences and perspectives in mainstream discourse and institutions, further exacerbating feelings of marginalisation. Spatial segregation and the existence of parallel societies also play a significant role in shaping the experiences of various groups in the Netherlands. Muslim respondents discussed the challenges of living in segregated neighbourhoods, where they faced limited opportunities for social mobility and interaction with the broader Dutch society, reinforcing feelings of isolation. Nationalist respondents, in contrast, expressed concerns about the changing demographics of Dutch cities and the perceived threat of "Islamisation" in certain neighbourhoods.

The wider shift to the right in the Netherlands and other Western European countries over the past two decades has had a profound impact on the experiences of minority groups, especially Muslim communities. The rise of Islamophobia, the mainstreaming of far-right discourses, and the increasing support for populist parties have led to a hardening of attitudes towards diversity and a growing sense of insecurity among minority populations. A shift towards a more assimilationist approach to integration, emphasising cultural adaptation and the adoption of Dutch values and norms, has increasingly shaped the Dutch government's response to these challenges. Critics have criticised this approach for primarily placing the onus of integration on minority communities, while neglecting to address the structural barriers and inequalities that perpetuate exclusion. Growing polarisation between progressive and conservative forces has marked the broader political landscape in the Netherlands, with issues such as immigration, integration, and national identity becoming increasingly contentious. The rise of right-wing populist parties and the mainstreaming of their discourses have pushed the political centre further to the right, leading to a normalisation of exclusionary rhetoric and policies. This shift to the right has had significant implications for the lives of minority communities in the Netherlands, particularly those of Muslim background. The increasingly hostile political climate, coupled with the erosion of social safety nets and the precarisation of labour markets,

has created a sense of uncertainty and vulnerability among these populations, potentially rendering some individuals more susceptible to radical ideologies that offer a sense of belonging and purpose.

Professor Mark Sedgwick presented the DRIVE project's findings on young people in Denmark. Key findings were that both Muslims and nationalists reported experiencing social exclusion, leading to alienation among 75% of Muslim interviewees and 65% of nationalist interviewees. The nature of alienation differed between the two groups. Muslims experienced alienation from Danish society as a whole and from the Danish state and politics. Nationalists were not alienated from Danish society but reported negative interactions with individuals. For Muslims, alienation primarily stemmed from interactions with ordinary people of the ethnic majority, rather than institutions like the police. Eighty-five per cent reported bad experiences with ordinary people. Sixty-nine per cent reported bad experiences in schools, including with teachers. Issues were reported in public spaces, especially on public transport, and in workplaces. Experiences ranged from outright aggression to micro-aggressions and well-intentioned but insensitive remarks. Cultural practices, such as drinking alcohol socially, contributed to feelings of exclusion.

Political discourse and government policies also contributed to Muslim alienation. Muslims often referenced political speeches, including those by mainstream politicians like the Social Democratic prime minister. The state's role in protecting ultranationalist actions, such as Quran burnings, was seen as more problematic than the actions themselves. Specific policies, like the "ghetto plan" (dispersing immigrant concentrations) and strict citizenship requirements, were frequently mentioned. Nationalists reported bad experiences with ordinary Muslims (70% of informants), often involving crime and occurring in schools. They also expressed strong views against "woke-ism," liberal understandings of gender, and trans rights. The study challenges some common assumptions. It suggests that blaming Islamist ideology for Muslim alienation is misplaced, as little evidence of Islamism was found. It questions the idea that Muslims self-isolate, as there are plenty of external factors to explain isolation. It cautions against attributing nationalist positions solely to abstract ideology, as informants emphasized their lived experiences.

The role of the state is complex. Rather than being a neutral arbitrator, the state can contribute to alienation through policies and discourse. Democratic processes that favour the majority can lead to policies and rhetoric that alienate minorities. While interfering with democracy is not the answer, awareness of the consequences of certain positions is crucial. The study supports the reciprocal radicalization hypothesis but in an unexpected way. Instead of extremists radicalizing each other directly, the process involves ordinary people and passes through state actions. Political discourse and policies aimed at appeasing nationalist voters can alienate Muslims, creating an indirect link between nationalism and Muslim alienation. The research highlights the structural nature of social exclusion, making it difficult to address. For Muslims, many sources of alienation (like micro-aggressions or cultural practices) are hard to change. For nationalists, the role of identity issues remains somewhat unclear due to their tendency to repeat party positions. The study emphasizes the need to recognize that political

positions and actions have consequences, even if democratically determined. It calls for a more nuanced understanding of the sources of alienation among both Muslims and nationalists, moving beyond simplistic ideological explanations to consider lived experiences and the complex role of the state and majority-minority dynamics in democratic societies.

Dr Eolene Boyd-MacMillan presented the DRIVE project's exploratory findings from interviews with a convenience sample of 48 young people in the United Kingdom (UK), some of whom also participated in focus groups. Thirty seven of the young people identified as Muslims, 8 as nationalists, and 3 as Young Conservatives. Before the nationalists agreed to interviews, the three Young Conservatives were interviewed in case they could shed light on nationalism, considering the rhetoric and policies some Conservatives support. While another sample might have, this sample did not and was not mentioned further. The two groups of self-identifying Muslims and nationalists were not viewed as comparable, but each reported experiences of social exclusion. The project used working definitions of 'social exclusion' as the process of marginalising or excluding certain individuals or groups from full participation in society, and of 'alienation' as a state of isolation or estrangement from oneself, others, or society.

Along with reports of social exclusion, both Muslims and nationalists reported feeling different in ways that may be alienating. The prevalence of these experiences varied between the two groups, with nearly all (92%) of Muslim interviewees reporting feeling different compared to more than half (63%) of nationalists. However, none of the Muslims interviewed were Islamists or indicated a desire to become one. The nationalists were self-identified ethnonationalists on the far right, but none advocated violence. For young Muslims in the UK, exclusion was associated with visibility and four contexts: educational and work settings, public spaces, while socialising. Government policies and political statements were also sources of feeling different. Young nationalists in the UK associate their sense of difference with diversity quotas, perceiving them as discriminatory, with other groups, such as immigrants and Muslims, and with government policies.

For the project's first of four hypotheses, spatial formation, some UK young people in each group reported being shaped by post-industrial spaces at the meso level. However, Muslims more frequently reported spatial formation occurring elsewhere. At the micro level, personal experiences significantly shaped Muslims in three contexts: education, work, public spaces. At the macro level, Muslims identified negative media portrayals and government policies (e.g., Prevent), as formational spaces shaping their self-perceptions. They reported curating diverse strategies to cope, such as personal awareness, safety precautions, educational efforts among themselves and others, religious practices, and either contacting or avoiding authorities. At the micro level, young nationalists described educational and work environments as formational. At the meso level, they mentioned declining fishing and seaside communities, as did young nationalists in the Netherlands. At the macro level, the practice of 'meta-politics' in public spaces (e.g., flash protests, leafleting) positively shaped young nationalists, while a declining civic society negatively shaped them. Self-censorship and living double lives

at work and university were their coping strategies, stemming from their fear of being kicked out of university or losing jobs.

For the second hypothesis, identity politics, young Muslims in the UK reported being perceived as a homogeneous group at the micro, meso, and macro levels, rather than being recognised as diverse religiously, politically, culturally, ethnically, and professionally. To cope with being perceived as monolithic rather than diverse and individual, they educate others, engage in self-reflection, challenge, and participate in community initiatives; these provide some hope and empowerment, but also cause fatigue and frustration. The identity politics of young nationalists at all three levels emphasise community, land, nation, racial purity, and traditional Christianity, paganism, or Odinism. Distrusting democratic processes, they engage in meta-politics, as previously stated, and otherwise cope through their close-knit 'brotherhood'. Both Muslims and nationalists have hybrid identities formed through online-offline engagement, which is political for nationalists and religious for Muslims.

For the third hypothesis, intergenerational change, both continuities and discontinuities were found at the micro, meso, and macro levels for each group. The young Muslims reported that their living conditions in more diverse and multi-cultural areas represented an improvement over their parents, along with educational and employment opportunities. They still experience harassment and discrimination, with some reporting changing their names to get a job, but it is less physical and more verbal. Overall, political engagement was lower than religious engagement, although still higher than their parents. Similar coping strategies were reported as previously mentioned. Young nationalists reported the opposite trend. They perceived their social, economic, living conditions, and social cohesion as significantly worse than their parents', with a decline in social cohesion and an increase in unemployment and homelessness. To cope, they turned to their group who provided practical, social, and emotional support.

The fourth and final hypothesis, reciprocal radicalisation, was not supported. The young Muslims interviewed in the UK did not demonstrate or align with Islamist ideologies. Rather, they reported the external application of the labels, 'radical' or 'extreme', imposed on them by others. To cope, they either advocate for change that they perceive as aligning with British values, but this is misperceived as hostility, or they turn inward, and this is misperceived as anti-social. Despite this, they report a strong desire to contribute positively to British society. The young nationalists ideologically oppose Muslims, immigrants, and multiculturalism, rather than report negative personal experiences. They report agreeing with Muslims more than other white people on crime, religious fundamentalism, and racial purity, but as ethnonationalists still perceive Muslims as a threat and prefer they were not here. To cope, their group is building an alternate society and predicts the inevitable outbreak of violence, although they are personally against it.

In keeping with these findings, any radicalisation of thoughts that might occur would be through multiple mediators and moderators. Muslims report that nationalists express their views in public and receive extensive media coverage, thereby influencing both the wider public and politicians, eventually leading to the proposal of and support for discriminatory policies. Nationalists report that Muslims have successfully mobilised

a cultural and political vanguard to dominate large areas of large cities and legislate against white privilege. Diagrammatic integration of these reports highlighted multi-directional influences among the named actor institutions and groups. As a result, cross-sector actions promoting resilience and preventing the risk of resilience depletion associated with the findings across all working hypotheses will need to be multi-levelled, multi-directional, cross-sector, and whole population-based rather than purely or mainly individual or group-targeted.

Professor Gabe Mythen presented a summary of the United Kingdom's findings from the semi-structured interviews conducted with practitioners and activists as part of the DRIVE project. He commented that the initial recruitment strategy for qualitative interviews aimed to access a plurality of views and engage with diverse voices, including hard-to-reach groups. The semi-structured interviews were designed in conjunction with the project protocol, and the topic guide was indexed to the four DRIVE project hypotheses. The composition of the practitioner group included professionals in extremism and radicalisation prevention roles, counter-terrorism legislators and regulators, security and intelligence operatives, academic experts, youth and probation support workers, representatives of civil society organisations, and researchers based in policy-focused think tanks. The activist group comprised representatives of non-state charities and organisations focused on countering extremism, people working in community roles to combat extremism, independent campaigning activists, former members of proscribed groups, critical media commentators, and political actors.

Regarding the first hypothesis on spatial dynamics, the practitioner group were largely reluctant to specify specific urban areas or "hot spots" of extremism and primarily emphasised the structural and material conditions in urban locales as challenging and problematic. They noted that tangible grievances, such as access to housing, education, poverty, and unemployment, encouraged feelings of "not mattering" and that social exclusion created spaces for extremist groups to exploit. However, no causal links were established between post-industrial contexts and the acceleration of extremism in urban milieus. The activist group focused on the lack of educational, welfare, and leisure resources in urban areas, which they deemed critical to fuelling feelings of frustration, anger, and resentment. They also highlighted the exacerbating effects of government funding cuts in areas of local need and the lack of understanding of everyday conditions for excluded groups in urban areas, which intensified distrust in mainstream politics. Concerning the second hypothesis on intergenerational tensions, the practitioner group found no direct association between intergenerational conflicts and the propensity towards extremism among young people. However, they identified a significant experiential gap that produced tensions between generations and some resentment of elder generations by younger people. They also noted that the lack of technological capability for parents and carers may enable some young people to engage unchecked with hateful or extremist material. The activist group expressed empathy with young people in relation to the testing current circumstances they face, such as the (after) effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, high youth unemployment, limited opportunities, student debt, and the climate emergency. They recognised that young people distrusted formal politics and sought out alternative explanations for their

realities, including conspiracy theories. They also felt that young people lacked platforms to articulate their views and perspectives and were “spoken for” in public arenas by elders.

Regarding the third hypothesis on identity politics, the practitioner group acknowledged the diversification of identities and lifestyle choices for young people and the access to “multiple truths” via the globalisation of media and culture, which they viewed as both enabling and disruptive. They also noted distinct changes in the patina of extremism, with singular, doctrinal ideologies being augmented by mixed forms of extremism, including Incel, misogynistic, conspiracy, and survivalist ideologies. The activist group believed that the challenges faced by socially excluded individuals and groups were likely to lead to a hunkering down and “siege mentality.” They also noted that dislike and fear of “others” could be heightened or aggravated by outside extremist influences, both online and face-to-face, including the targeting of specific vulnerable individuals and communities. For aggrieved and excluded groups, such as young Muslims, strong and resilient identities could be built in opposition to and rejection of stigmatisation. Finally, concerning the fourth hypothesis on reciprocal radicalisation, the practitioner group believed that reciprocal radicalisation had occurred at historical junctures in the UK, such as the sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland and the Far Right/Islamist clashes in Luton in the 1990s. However, they found less evidence that direct cycles of tit-for-tat extremism were prevalent in contemporary Britain between specific opposing Islamist and Far Right groups. The activist group provided specific examples of attempts to stir up trouble and incite/provoke, such as Islamist agitators in Birmingham in the 2000s and Far Right anti-immigrant agitators in Knowsley, Merseyside, in 2023. However, a sizeable majority expressed that no concrete and embedded patterns of direct reciprocal radicalisation were prevalent in the contemporary UK.

Professor Valerie DeMarinis working on the DRIVE project through her appointments at Umeå University, the University of Oslo, and Innlandet Hospital Trust, presented the DRIVE project’s findings on social exclusion and alienation among Muslim and nationalist youth in Norway. The study employed a framework of micro (individual and family), meso (local community/neighbourhood and policies/programs underway in these communities/neighbourhoods), and macro levels (legal system, state policies, and political structure) to understand and analyse the data. The analysis included data from the semi-structured interviews with young persons as well as a brief overview of the data emerging from the ethics-required Wellness Checks, which all young persons in Norway and all of the DRIVE countries completed as part of the interview process. At the micro-level, 95% of Muslim youth reported experiencing discrimination and racism personally, with the figure rising to 100% when including incidents involving family members and close friends. These experiences occurred in various daily life situations, such as on public transportation, in grocery stores, being excluded from or not able to participate in cultural-rituals with young people (such as drinking alcohol), and in encounters with ethnic Norwegians, especially older generations. Nationalist youth, in contrast, reported only 5% of direct discrimination experiences, with 10% of their friends in the party experiencing such incidents, mainly from ethnic Norwegians when their political stance was known. In contrast to Muslim youth, nationalist youth often

expressed a degree of support from older generations of Norwegians, and found that most of their experiences of discrimination came from individuals supporting a perceived left-oriented view supporting state policies such as migration, gender issues, and multicultural perspectives. These findings link to certain aspects of one of the project's hypotheses related to inter-generational differences. At the meso level, 85% of Muslim youth faced discrimination, racism, and microaggressions in schools, jobs, housing, and interactions with police and social services on a regular basis. For nationalist youth, only 15% reported such experiences in schools, jobs, and housing when their political views were made known.

Both Muslim and nationalist youth unanimously agreed that at the macro level, politics, state policies, and societal movements contributed to their experiences of exclusion. Muslim youth cited immigration policies targeting Muslims, certain gender policies in schools, religious freedom bias, "wokeism," and a lack of safe spaces for open discussion as sources of alienation. Nationalist youth pointed to similar issues, perceiving a shift in societal norms towards a leftist-oriented position. To cope with these experiences of alienation, Muslim youth relied on faith (beliefs and practices), family, and their local community, while nationalist youth turned to their political beliefs, party practices, family and friends with like-minded worldviews, and the political community where they felt heard and supported. Both groups maintained an underlying belief in the hope for a better Norway, though what this would entail for Muslims was a multicultural and democratic society, and in contrast for the nationalist youth involved, in part, a reduction in migration, especially of Muslims, and a return to proper Norwegian values. The Wellness Checks, as noted, conducted as part of the overall study revealed that Norway was an outlier. Whilst Norway had the lowest percentage of young persons experiencing symptoms of daily distress (somatic, psychological, and existential) at a cut-off level signalling a very lowered level of daily function in comparison to the other three countries, Norwegian youth also had the lowest percentage of resilience among the four country populations. Both lowered measures (of daily dysfunction symptoms and of resilience functions) are important factors to be analysed together. They may contribute, in combination with other factors, to radicalising patterns of thought for young people, a turning inwards after repeated experiences of perceived discrimination and exclusion. However, it is important to note that there was a statistically significant difference between Muslim and nationalist youth in Norway, with 60% of Muslim youth and 10% of nationalist youth experiencing these patterns of distress with somatic, psychological, and existential symptoms interacting with reduced resilience functions, due to the often daily exposure and 'dose effect' of alienation experiences at the micro level. In these situations, there was no respite and gradually their resilience resources were being drained and a sense of growing hopelessness for changes in society and for changes in their daily experiences of discriminatory and racist verbal and sometimes physical encounters.

The study found no support for direct reciprocal radicalisation between Muslim and nationalist youth, which was another of the project hypotheses. In an ongoing analysis of the data, there seems to be initial emerging patterns supporting the idea that the role of the state and national policies on migration, especially concerning Muslims,

may act as a mediator for some patterns and a moderator for other patterns of thought change between members of these two youth populations. However, further analysis will test this emerging hypothesis. It is important to note that no young Norwegian participants in this study supported any type of violence. A crucial distinction between changing thought patterns and changing behaviours is essential for this project and in general for research on radicalisation.

The Muslim activists interviewed in this project all were working for the integration of young Muslims into a functioning and democratic Norwegian society. Some of the nationalist activists interviewed supported a range of exclusionary actions, especially against Muslims. However, the majority of nationalist young persons clearly expressed that they did not support the most far-right groups and political parties, and actively dissociated themselves from groups like SIAN (Stop the Islamisation of Norway). Regarding the project hypothesis on identity politics, this hypothesis was supported with an important modification for the young Muslims. All of the nationalist youth discussed the importance of their political party affiliation and part work as being central to their identity. In many ways the political party affiliations have provided several of the nationalist youth with a new family when their original family ostracized them over differences in political views. For all of the Muslim youth, all of whom were practising Muslims, religion was discussed as an important base of their identity. However, they also felt very strongly about their Norwegian identity. They were proud to be Norwegian citizens and were strongly affected by remarks made to them by ethnic Norwegians stating directly or implying that Muslims cannot be 'Norwegians' as the value systems are too different. Both groups discussed elements of having hybrid identities and the need to navigate experiences in different ways depending upon whether or not they felt threatened or in spaces that were not safe. This attention to spaces was linked to the project's first hypothesis related to spaces and neighbourhoods. For Muslim youth, mainly living in minority dominated neighbourhoods, the neighbourhoods generally felt like safe spaces where they could be themselves, though aware that these neighbourhoods also had problem areas and were more neglected. Travelling to other neighbourhoods for work or school were for many less safe due to negative incidents on public transportation or discriminatory comments made especially to Muslim women wearing the hijab. For nationalist youth, the theme of negative, unsafe geographical spaces were linked to neighbourhoods with many minority groups, while positive, safe spaces were in the neighbourhoods where their political parties met.

Comments related to the topic of radicalisation often contained references to the problematic nature of language related to ideologies and how unsubstantiated ideological ideas have dominated all thoughts and actions. Interestingly, both of these groups of young people, Muslims and nationalists, talked about the dangers of this usage of the term 'ideology' and the labelling accompanying it. Instead, the findings supported the importance of understanding meaning-making worldviews and meaning-making processes rather than simplistic ideological models for understanding the relationship between experiences leading to a sense of alienation and how radicalisation of thinking and a turning inwards may happen. Professor DeMarinis emphasised the need for creating safe spaces for effective dialogue between young persons, and the need to

understanding the complex interaction among the micro, meso, and macro levels to address the issues of social exclusion and alienation. She highlighted the importance of prevention- and resilience-building efforts, citing the recent report from the Norwegian National Commission on Extremism (NOU 2024: 11) titled “Joint Efforts Against Extremism: Better Conditions for Preventive Work.” The findings from the Norwegian context underscore the complexity of the experiences of social exclusion and alienation among Muslim and nationalist youth, as well as the need for nuanced, multi-level approaches for fostering inclusion and preventing radicalisation. Policymakers and practitioners must consider the diverse experiences and coping mechanisms of these groups when designing interventions and initiatives to promote social cohesion and resilience.

Summary of key points and discussions from Day 1:

Day 1 of the conference laid the foundation for a rich and engaging exploration of the nexus between social exclusion and radicalisation. The keynote speech and country-specific presentations illuminated the multidimensional nature of these phenomena, challenging simplistic narratives and highlighting the importance of situating radicalisation within broader societal dynamics. Participants engaged in lively discussions, sharing insights from their diverse disciplinary backgrounds and professional experiences. The day concluded with a reception at the Stanhope Hotel, providing an opportunity for informal networking and further exchange of ideas.

4. Day 2: Bridging Research and Policy

Panel 2: Public mental health consequences of social exclusion:

The second day of the conference began with a panel exploring the public mental health consequences of social exclusion. The Public Mental Health Team Principal Investigators (PIs), Professor Valerie DeMarinis (Umeå University, Inlandet Hospital Trust, and Oslo University), and Dr Eolene Boyd-MacMillan (University of Cambridge), presented compelling evidence on the reduction of mental health and resilience functions, as well as the social and emotional toll of marginalisation and alienation. The discussion emphasised the importance of cross-sector partnerships that include public mental health promotion and prevention approaches to radicalization and extremism. Such approaches entail whole-population actions that promote resilience, thereby reducing the risk that social and emotional distress may lead to the development of some more radical thought patterns for those who are particularly vulnerable. However, such development would involve the interaction of many factors, as there is no clear pathway to radicalization of thoughts or behaviours.

The public mental health panel also presented their findings from mixed-methods data collected with Muslim and nationalist young people across all four project countries. A public mental health framework was part of the project's interdisciplinary exploratory research design. This framework understood how important it was to include

culture, context, and social determinants of health, like social exclusion, in any analysis of research data on extremism and radicalization. Before the conclusion of all ethically compliant interviews with young people, a 12-item "wellness check" was included to assess how they were experiencing and coping with daily life challenges. We combined two instruments to form the wellness check: the SCL-10, a ten-item symptom check list, and the CD-Risc-2, a two-item Connor-Davidson resilience check list. All four project countries have validated both instruments. The SCL-10 findings revealed that although the sample populations in each country were non-clinical (ordinary youth), approximately one quarter of the entire youth sample reported symptoms at a clinical level (the same level of distress and dysfunction as young patients in treatment for depression and/or anxiety). Within these findings, Norway was an outlier, with far fewer youth experiencing this level of dysfunction. We found that Muslim young people in all four countries faced greater risk than their nationalist counterparts. Many young Muslims across the four countries likely experience some form of social exclusion almost daily. Interestingly, Norway was also an outlier in the CD-Risc-2 findings, with the sample reporting lower levels of resilience markers than the other countries. Again, Muslim young people were at greater risk due to the 'dose effect' of repeated exposure to daily life stressors. It is crucial to analyse the results of these instruments together, as patterns of reduced mental health functions and reduced resilience can play a significant role in a turning-inward process that aims to isolate the individual or group from the painful experiences of social exclusion.

The findings showed that there were similarities between groups regarding the resilience factor and difficulties in adjusting to change. This factor has a strong correlation with changes in thought and behaviour routines and meaning-making processes. Researchers also noted the interaction of physical, psychological, and existential symptoms. We found that repeated patterns of adverse experiences have a traumatic effect, depleting resilience resources. Muslim participants across all four countries reported greater effects of social exclusion, discrimination, and daily life stresses compared to nationalists. The Wellness Check results across countries showed a statistically significant correlation with this report. Both groups separately reported that they were doing all they could individually to cope with the effects of social exclusion and that they required access to resources, especially at the meso and macro levels of concern. These findings highlight the need for resources and programmes: 1) that address how young people make meaning in their daily lives and involve them in program planning; 2) that incorporate knowledge of the interacting micro, meso, and macro levels of functioning; 3) that incorporate the resilience resources of these young people; and 4) that understand the differential impact of social exclusion on public mental health outcomes among Muslim and nationalist youth. The quantitative data findings align with the qualitative findings from participant reports of social interactions and emotions during the interviews and focus groups. The numerical findings from the 'wellness checks' (symptom tick list and resilience marker tick list) completed during the semi-structured interviews, presented within three categories for each group: negative emotions and feelings, positive emotions and feelings, and positive social interactions, provide a detailed understanding of the data.

Across all four countries, DK, NL, NO, and UK, at the micro, meso, and macro levels, Muslims reported negative emotions and feelings related to racism and discrimination in educational and work-related contexts and with members of the general public, as well as related to government policies and stances and in response to national or international events. The negative emotions and feelings they identified included fear, anger, worry, helplessness, anxiety, a sense of insecurity, frustration, discomfort, shock, resignation, hyper-vigilance towards oneself and others, distrust, and hopelessness. In three countries (DK, NO, and the UK), such as public name-calling, physical attack and harassment, changes in personal relationships, COVID-19, and a sense of rejection and powerlessness to change society. In DK, the negative emotions and feelings are not as severe as in NO, although in DK, NL, and NO, some reported physical attacks by minority groups. Nationalists in the UK, where nationalist parties do not hold power and have a higher membership, particularly among those who have faced social inequalities and deprivations, have expressed feelings of fear, disappointment, abandonment, shame, silence, and isolation. Additionally, half of them have reported facing parental disapproval and government scapegoating. A small number of young nationalists in the Netherlands reported negative social connections at both the micro and meso levels, which they attributed to adverse experiences during the COVID-19 pandemic and difficulties in making new friends after relocating to a new area.

Across all four countries at the micro, meso, and macro levels, Muslims reported positive emotions and feelings related to place attachment, visibility, diversity, multiculturalism, family, education, their mosque, politics, and work. In the UK, Muslims also reported positive emotions and feelings related to being respected, accommodated, supported, connected, belonging, and fitting in. However, in Norway, the positivity was more muted and focused on feeling safe, warm, accepted, and understood within a wider context of unsafety. Across three countries—DK, NL, and the UK—nationalists reported positive emotions and feelings related to party membership and engagement. In DK, nationalists also associate positive emotions and feelings with home, feeling safe, and school. In the UK, positive emotions and feelings are also associated with place attachment, online engagement, and a reluctance to interact with Muslims on topics such as crime, racial mixing, and religious fundamentalism—more so than with white people. However, they still view Muslims as a threat and avoid them. Finally, across all four countries, at the micro, meso, and macro levels, Muslims reported positive social connections related to family, similar and diverse friendships across ethnic lines, their community, religion, area, educational and work contexts, and the general public. In DK, positive social connections also related to friends who understood intersectional (dual or more) ethnic and cultural identities and home situations, not taking a ‘victim’ role, online connections, and three mentioned parental affirmation of both genders. One noted that radicalization can happen without a sense of belonging, hence the importance of the mosque being open and welcoming. In both DK and NO, unexpected positive encounters with members of the general public, at work, or in education generated positive emotions. People in the UK reported positive encounters with state representatives like the police, but they also associated negative emotions and feelings with them, such as racial profiling, unnecessary stops, and searches. At the micro,

meso, and macro levels across all four countries, nationalists reported positive social connections related to party membership, shared party views, friendships with party members, a sense of belonging, parents, religion, and during COVID-19. Nationalists in the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK also reported positive social connections with migrants and Muslims, although they qualified this in the UK, as previously mentioned. In DK and the UK, positive connections occurred in hybrid (online-offline) spaces, identities, and engagement. In Denmark, Norway, and the UK, positive social connections engendered hope. Norwegian nationalists emphasised the importance of celebrations.

As the above reveals, Muslims can experience both negative and positive emotions and feelings in the same context. Navigating positive and negative tensions in the same spaces creates unpredictability, requiring enormous amounts of energy to prepare to respond to positive or negative encounters and to live with not knowing which they will be. The resilience marker with a low 'patient level' score. Young people's lives from the ages of 18 to 25, the age range of our sample, normally entail a large amount of change, even without ongoing experiences of discrimination and hostility. The unpredictability will increase their stress and anxiety and reduce their resilience to change. According to their extensive coping strategy reports, young people are doing all they can and require access to resilience resources at the meso (community) and macro (structural) levels to avoid loss of function.

Panel 3: Findings on far right and nationalist groups:

Moderated by Professor Christian Kaunert from Dublin City University, the third panel focused on the DRIVE Project's findings related to far right and nationalist groups. Speakers Mark Sedgwick and Gabe Mythen shared insights into the ideological, organisational, and recruitment strategies employed by these groups, as well as the sociopolitical contexts fuelling their growth. Respondents Joel Busher (Coventry University) and Lynn Schneider (ICCT, Netherlands) offered additional perspectives, highlighting the need for tailored, context-specific interventions to address the unique challenges posed by far-right extremism.

Professor Mark Sedgwick presented findings on far right and nationalist groups from the DRIVE project, focusing on the topic of social exclusion experienced by nationalists. He began by clarifying the definition of "nationalist" informants interviewed in the study, which varied slightly across the four countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom). In Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, researchers interviewed members of youth organisations affiliated with nationalist political parties and groups, while in the Netherlands, they also interviewed people from rural areas who were not involved in political activism and were more likely to experience rural poverty. In the United Kingdom, with its different political system, they interviewed a different type of person. Sedgwick emphasised that the majority of the interviewees were not extremists, but their experiences were still significant for understanding extremism, as nationalist extremists are also nationalists, and Islamist extremists are also Muslims. The study found that nationalists experienced alienation and social

exclusion, albeit to a lesser extent than Muslims, but still significantly greater than the non-nationalist, ethnic-majority population.

Using the four aspects of social exclusion identified in a 2016 United Nations report as a framework, Sedgwick discussed the findings related to alienation and social exclusion among nationalists. The highest levels of alienation were reported by young nationalist informants in Norway, with 50% feeling different from the general population and 30% hiding their political views and affiliations. Regarding economic exclusion, some informants in the Netherlands, particularly those living in declining areas such as fishing villages, reported economic disadvantage and concerns about housing costs. Sedgwick noted that nationalist voters tend to have non-academic, technical education and live in small towns, experiencing relative economic deprivation compared to better-educated and better-paid sections of the population. Perceived exclusion from political life was a common theme in the interviews, with respondents expressing a lack of representation by metropolitan elites in politics and the media. Sedgwick attributed this partly to the sampling strategy and the respondents' affiliation with nationalist parties' youth organisations. Respondents were also critical of "woke-ism," particularly the developing liberal consensus on gender and trans-rights issues, which they associated with metropolitan liberal elites.

Exclusion from social life was reported more frequently than expected, with young Danish and Norwegian nationalists experiencing hostility and fear of sanctions for their political views. Sedgwick noted the irony that nationalist minorities suffer at the hands of the national majority, just as Muslim minorities do. Nationalists also reported negative experiences with Muslims, particularly in schools, where they encountered violence, threats, criminality, and disruptive behaviour. These reports challenged the assumption that the personal experience of Muslims serves as a cure for Islamophobia. Sedgwick argued that a fear of exclusion from cultural life is central to nationalism, with nationalists seeking to prevent cultural changes that they feel may exclude them. Informants in the Netherlands often referred to *Zwarte Piet* (Black Pete), a classic issue in the country's culture wars. The main conclusion drawn from the study was that social exclusion is indeed experienced by nationalists as well as Muslims. While the project initially expected to find economic exclusion as a common factor, other forms of exclusion were found to be more important in the Nordic welfare societies. Sedgwick suggested that nationalists, despite being members of the majority, experience social exclusion as a minority, which helps explain how some can experience intense alienation that contributes to extremist radicalisation and violence. He advocated for reducing the emphasis on ideology in explaining nationalist positions and paying more attention to lived experiences. While acknowledging the difficulty of changing structural factors that lead to social exclusion, Sedgwick recommended focusing on addressing the bad experiences in schools reported by both Muslim and nationalist informants. He concluded by noting that members of the nationalist minority will likely continue to face social exclusion and consequent alienation.

Using fieldwork from the DRIVE project, Professor Gabe Mythen presented a comparative analysis of far right and nationalist groups. The presentation was structured in several sections, starting with an introduction and context, followed by an overview of

key findings and policy implications. Professor Mythen began by addressing the definitional issues surrounding the terms “extremism,” “nationalism,” and “far-right politics.” He noted the rise of populist nationalism across Europe and the distinctions between formal democratic nationalist political parties and far-right activist groups. Use of DRIVE project terminology was also qualified, with “nationalist” used as a self-ascribed term and “far right” as an attributed descriptor. Mythen also highlighted the national-level similarities and differences, with the UK being considered anomalous within the DRIVE project. The presentation then looked into the specific findings from each of the four countries studied:

1. Denmark: Nationalists expressed opposition to open immigration and multiculturalism, concerns regarding the erosion of Danish culture and heritage, negative experiences with Muslims, rejection of Islamic values and traditions, distrust in elite power, and reported cyclical conflict between nationalists and Muslims.
2. Netherlands: Nationalists perceived threats to Dutch culture and traditions from Islam, “globalism,” and policies on immigration and multiculturalism. They also expressed concerns about existential security risks (*bestaanszekerheid*), engaged with conspiracy theories, critiqued “left-liberal elites” and “wokeism,” and utilised online spaces that facilitated further polarisation between nationalists and Muslims.
3. Norway: Nationalists faced resentment as a result of perceived social and economic exclusion, stigma from prejudice and bias against indigenous Norwegians, fear of immigrants diluting Norwegian culture and values, anti-Muslim/Islamic views, xenophobia, racism, and challenges to established Norwegian “ways of life” from “wokeism” and changing gender notions.
4. United Kingdom: Nationalists expressed concerns about the failures of immigration policy and multiculturalism, distrust in formal politics, feelings of disenfranchisement and alienation, perceived institutionalised social exclusion of the white British population, multi-level conflict and violence, and ethno-nationalist views involving fears of Muslims/Islam and immigrants “taking over” urban and rural spaces.

Professor Mythen presented comparative insights, noting transitional fears related to globalisation, immigration, multiculturalism, and the dilution of national identity. He also highlighted feelings of marginalisation, disconnection, and detachment among nationalists, with social exclusion serving as an ideational motor. The presentation addressed the overlapping and blurring discourses between nationalist and far-right activist groups and the role of online spaces in amplifying commitment. Finally, Professor Mythen discussed the policy implications of the findings, emphasising the need to understand and respond to gravitational pulls with “critical empathy,” address material factors that lead to detachment, frustration, and alienation, provide structures and platforms for engagement, meaning, and identity building for young people, advance online regulation, promote inclusive narratives that disrupt stigmatising ideologies, and encourage “joined upness” by breaking silos.

Discussant responses were provided by Joel Busher (Coventry University) and Lynn Schneider (ICCT, Netherlands) who highlighted several areas of advance that the

DRIVE project had produced. The discussants also flagged the importance of connecting together ideational/ideological factors with material factors in research and policy making and the importance of ensuring that prevention and counter-extremism work is context-sensitive and tailored to particular local conditions.

Panel 4: Findings on Muslim communities and government relations:

The fourth panel, moderated by Richard McNeil-Willson from the University of Edinburgh, discussed the DRIVE Project's findings on the dynamics between Muslim communities and government relations. Speakers Tahir Abbas and Valerie DeMarinis presented evidence on the impact of discriminatory policies, stigmatisation, and securitisation on Muslim communities' experiences of social exclusion and their potential implications for radicalisation. Respondents Amna Kaleen (University of Sheffield) and Paul Thomas (University of Huddersfield) offered critical reflections, emphasising the need for inclusive, participatory approaches to engagement that prioritise the agency and empowerment of marginalised communities.

Professor Valerie DeMarinis explored the social and emotional findings gleaned from interviews and focus groups conducted as part of the DRIVE project. The data revealed a complex tapestry of negative and positive emotions experienced by both Muslim and nationalist youth across the four countries studied. Muslim participants reported a range of negative emotions, including feelings of isolation, loneliness, and anxiety, which were often exacerbated by the disruption of routines and the separation of family members during the COVID-19 pandemic. At the meso level, Muslim youth expressed frustration with the negative portrayal of immigrant communities in the media, highlighting the disproportionate losses these communities faced due to housing situations and the lack of support for schools and community services in immigrant neighbourhoods. The media's portrayal of Muslims and mosques as spreaders of COVID-19 further compounded their sense of alienation. At the macro level, Muslim participants pointed to the unequal distribution of resources in schools and social services, as well as the disparities in access to information and procedures. Despite these challenges, Muslim youth also identified positive experiences and sources of resilience. At the micro level, they found solace in spending more time with family, practicing their religion, reading the Quran, and praying. Online support from friends also served as a buffer against isolation. At the meso level, some participants reported receiving support from their employers and communities, with Muslim communities and individuals actively working to provide services during the pandemic. While generally supportive of lockdown measures, Muslim youth noted some exceptions at the macro level.

Nationalist youth similarly grappled with negative emotions, including isolation, loneliness, and the strain of living with others holding opposing views. The forced separation of family members and the loss of friends to the virus took a heavy toll, compounded by job losses. At the meso level, nationalist participants expressed distrust of mainstream media, perceiving an alarmist approach to COVID-19 coverage and a smear campaign against their political party. Macro-level concerns included suspicions

of government conspiracy theories surrounding lockdown policies, the exaggeration of danger, and the loss of autonomy, as well as foreign conspiracies, such as those implicating China. However, nationalist youth also found solace and support in online communities, forging new friendships and dedicating time to learning more about politics. At the meso level, nationalist support systems emerged, providing food and assistance with job searches, fostering a sense of caring and sharing among community members. Some participants noted the strengthening of alliances with certain political parties at the macro level. Professor DeMarinis emphasised the importance of adopting a public mental health promotion approach that acknowledges the multi-levelled and multi-directional factors influencing mental health, recognising that mental health and mental illness are not simply opposites but separate domains. The coexistence of negative and positive emotions within the same spaces highlights the tension and complexity of these experiences.

Alarmingly, a quarter of the non-patient groups in the study exhibited significant distress, with others also struggling. Professor DeMarinis warned of the risk of resilience depletion if these individuals continue to lack access to necessary resources and programs. She underscored the critical need for promotion, prevention, and intervention efforts to consider the meaning-making processes, both cultural and existential, that shape the experiences and resilience of Muslim and nationalist youth. The findings from the DRIVE project underscore the urgency of addressing the mental health needs of these communities, particularly in light of the additional challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Policymakers and practitioners must work to develop targeted, culturally sensitive interventions that bolster resilience, foster social support, and address the structural inequalities that contribute to the alienation and distress experienced by Muslim and nationalist youth.

In his lecture, Professor Abbas provided a critical multidisciplinary analysis of the experiences of Muslim minority communities in Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom, examining the profound impacts of immigration, integration, and counter-extremism policies. Abbas looked at how racialized discourses, colonial legacies, and intersecting systems of oppression affected marginalisation, identity negotiation, and the chance of becoming radicalised. He did this by using critical race theory, postcolonial perspectives, and intersectionality. The paper used two rich datasets: the DRIVE survey, which collected responses from 5,501 participants across the four countries, and an extensive interview dataset, which included 417 interviews conducted between Spring 2021 and Spring 2024. The findings highlighted the centrality of religious identity in shaping Muslim minorities' experiences, particularly in relation to the prioritisation of faith networks and the impact of religious discrimination on community dynamics. The analysis also revealed the interplay of spatial factors, governance approaches, and the risk of radicalisation, emphasising the urgent need for holistic and participatory policymaking that addresses the root causes of exclusion and marginalisation.

The paper explored the complexities of Muslim minority experiences through the lenses of critical race theory, postcolonial perspectives, and intersectionality, illuminating the structural, cultural, and psychological factors that shaped these

experiences. The findings underscored the importance of religious identity in prioritising faith networks, especially among Muslim and other minority faith communities, while also highlighting the diminishing effect of religious identity on faith community prioritisation with age. The reciprocal relationship between experiences of religious discrimination and the increased likelihood of seeking support from one's marginalised faith community was a crucial finding, suggesting a potential vicious cycle of exclusion and radicalisation. The paper shed light on the role of spatial factors in shaping the experiences of Muslim communities and the risk of radicalisation, with the concentration of Muslim populations in urban areas characterised by socio-economic deprivation and limited access to resources exacerbating feelings of marginalisation and exposure to extremist narratives. The findings also highlighted the role of governance approaches in shaping Muslim communities' experiences and the dynamics of polarisation and cohesion, suggesting that assimilationist policies and securitized approaches to integration could contribute to Muslim communities' stigmatisation and alienation.

The findings have significant implications for policies aimed at fostering social cohesion and inclusion in Western European societies. To effectively address the root causes of exclusion and marginalisation experienced by Muslim communities, Abbas argued that policymakers must adopt a comprehensive and multi-faceted approach, including measures to combat Islamophobia and discrimination, promote equal access to opportunities, and support the development of inclusive social networks. Engaging Muslim communities as active partners in the policymaking process was crucial to ensuring that policies were responsive to their needs and experiences. Abbas emphasised that this study contributed to the ongoing efforts to confront the challenges faced by Muslim communities in Western Europe by providing a nuanced, evidence-based analysis that took seriously the lived experiences and perspectives of those most directly affected by the policies and discourses that shaped their lives.

Panel 5: Translating research into policy impact:

The final panel of the conference focused on strategies for translating the DRIVE Project's research findings into tangible policy impact. Opening remarks by Cátia Moreira de Carvalho from Leiden University set the stage for a roundtable discussion featuring all DRIVE Principal Investigators alongside Alberto Contaretti (Radicalisation Awareness Network), Christian Kaunert (Dublin City University), and Joana de Deus Pereira (RUSI Europe), who chaired the discussion. Panellists shared insights on effective knowledge mobilisation strategies, the challenges of navigating policy landscapes, and opportunities for leveraging research to drive evidence-based decision-making. The discussion underscored the importance of sustained, collaborative efforts to bridge the gap between academia and policymaking.

Summary of key points and discussions from Day 2:

Day 2 of the conference showcased the breadth and depth of the DRIVE Project's findings, highlighting the relationship between psychological, social, political, and

ideological factors shaping the dynamics of social exclusion and radicalisation. Panels on public mental health, far right and nationalist groups, and Muslim communities and government relations offered nuanced insights into the specific challenges and opportunities within each domain. The final panel on translating research into policy impact underscored the critical role of academic-policy engagement in driving evidence-based strategies for prevention and resilience-building. Throughout the day, participants engaged in detailed and robust discussions, sharing experiences, best practices, and visions for collaborative action.

5. Outcomes and Insights

Main takeaways and conclusions from the conference:

The DRIVE Project conference succeeded in its aim of providing a platform for disseminating cutting-edge research, fostering interdisciplinary dialogue, and catalysing collaborative action to address the compounded nature of social exclusion and radicalisation. Key takeaways included:

- Recognising the multidimensional nature of radicalisation and the need for holistic, context-sensitive approaches that situate individual vulnerabilities within broader societal dynamics
- Emphasising the importance of proactive, inclusive strategies that prioritise the agency, empowerment, and resilience of marginalised communities
- Acknowledging the critical role of mental health considerations in understanding and addressing pathways to extremism
- Underscoring the urgency of tailored interventions to counter the unique challenges posed by far-right and nationalist groups
- Highlighting the importance of sustained, collaborative efforts to bridge research and policy, ensuring that evidence-based insights inform decision-making at all levels

Conceptual and theoretical advances:

The conference showcased significant conceptual and theoretical advances in the field of radicalisation studies. Presentations and discussions challenged simplistic, linear models of radicalisation, emphasising the need for more nuanced, contextually-grounded frameworks that take account not only of the individual and social but also of structural factors. Participants also highlighted the importance of intersectional approaches that recognise the compounding effects of multiple forms of marginalisation and exclusion.

Strengthened networks and collaborations:

A key outcome of the conference was the strengthening of networks and collaborations among participants. The event provided a rare opportunity for scholars, policymakers,

practitioners, and community groups to engage in face-to-face dialogue, share expertise, and identify potential synergies. Many participants reported forging new connections and exploring opportunities for future research and practice collaborations. The DRIVE Project team committed to maintaining and expanding these networks beyond the conference, recognising their critical role in driving sustained, impactful action.

6. Notes and Observations Based on Perspectives from the Audience

The DRIVE conference facilitated engaging discussions and thought-provoking exchanges among the attendees, who shared their perspectives, raised intriguing questions, and offered valuable insights. The following notes and observations, compiled by a dedicated research intern, Floor Mulkom, capture the essence of these discussions, and highlight the key themes that emerged throughout the two-day event.

Conceptual and methodological considerations:

Audience members raised important questions regarding the conceptual and methodological aspects of the DRIVE project. One participant inquired about the researchers' proximity to the actual lived experiences of social exclusion and how individual interpretations were accounted for in the study. In response, Professor Gabe Mythen acknowledged the challenges of measuring socially constructed phenomena and suggested that focusing on the intensity and depth of experiences could be a potential solution, albeit difficult to quantify.

Another attendee asked about the use of the term "microaggressions" and its implications, given that the response to such incidents is often institutional. Professor Valerie DeMarinis clarified that microaggressions refer to well-meaning but offensive actions by the majority population, such as speaking to a Muslim in English despite their proficiency in the native language.

The audience also raised questions about the comparability of the Muslim and nationalist groups in the study, with one participant noting that "Muslims" is a broad label, while "nationalists" is a self-appointed term. The researchers were asked to contextualise their samples with care and nuance to avoid overgeneralisation.

Navigating Terminology and Definitions:

The audience engaged in discussions surrounding the terminology and definitions used in the DRIVE project. Participants sought clarification on terms such as "radicalisation of thought and behaviour," "Islamist," and "vulnerable." The researchers were encouraged to provide clear definitions and contextualise their usage to ensure clarity and consistency throughout the project's outputs.

One attendee raised the question of whether there were any instances of individuals identifying as both nationalists and Muslims, considering the potential mutual exclusivity of these identities. The researchers responded by noting that

nationalist parties in the studied countries were generally exclusive of Muslims, although the complexity of nationalism as a concept was acknowledged.

Exploring the Intersection of Social Exclusion and Mental Health:

The mental health implications of social exclusion emerged as a prominent theme during the conference. Audience members inquired about the potential correlation between experiences of exclusion and specific mental health challenges, such as difficulty sleeping. Professor Valerie DeMarinis emphasised the importance of recognising the significance of frequently reported struggles, such as sleep disturbances or difficulty making friends, as signs of depleted functioning rather than focusing on causation versus correlation.

Another participant questioned the notion of “normalcy” in the context of the study’s findings and whether the data could be linked to meta-narratives and general populations. The impact of societal shifts, such as the increasing role of social media in replacing traditional parenting, on the measures used in the study was also discussed. The researchers acknowledged the need to re-calibrate cutoffs and measurements for various groups in the post-COVID era, emphasising the damaging nature of labels and the difficulty in shedding them.

Addressing the Complexities of Resilience and Coping Mechanisms:

The audience raised thought-provoking questions about resilience and its potential breakdown in the face of adversity. Participants were curious about the consequences of depleted resilience beyond violence and how the COVID-19 pandemic might have contributed to the erosion of resilience among the studied populations. The researchers highlighted the cumulative and interlinked nature of COVID-19’s impact on participants, extending beyond health-related symptoms to profound social implications.

One audience member inquired about the role of faith in coping with experiences of exclusion and alienation, particularly in cases where individuals might not have a strong religious affiliation or experience fluctuations in their faith. The researchers acknowledged the importance of considering the diversity within the studied groups and the need to explore the nuances of religious identity and its impact on resilience.

Navigating the Research-Policy Nexus:

The conference attendees actively engaged in discussions concerning the translation of research findings into policy recommendations and the challenges associated with evidence-based decision-making. Participants inquired about the difficulties faced by the DRIVE project in translating its diverse findings into policy-relevant recommendations, particularly in light of the evolving political landscape and shifting policy priorities.

The researchers shared their experiences of engaging with policymakers at various levels, highlighting the importance of establishing trust, facilitating ongoing dialogue, and ensuring that research results are communicated effectively to inform policy decisions. The role of epistemic communities and interdisciplinary collaboration in bridging the gap between research and policy was also discussed, with the

researchers emphasising the need for researchers to step out of their comfort zones and actively engage with policymakers to drive evidence-based change.

One participant raised the question of how research can continue to maintain its independence while being policy-informed and guided, especially in the context of shifting political priorities and funding landscapes. The researchers acknowledged the delicate balance between maintaining academic integrity and responding to policy needs, stressing the importance of transparency, open communication, and mutual understanding between researchers and policymakers.

The audience also reflected on the power dynamics at play in the research-policy nexus, with one attendee asking, “Under what conditions can policymakers make an impact?” The researchers highlighted the significance of direct engagement with policymakers in setting strategic directions, the role of initiatives like the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in translating research into policy-relevant recommendations, and the long-term impact of sustained dialogue and relationship-building with decision-makers.

Conclusion:

The notes and observations compiled by the research intern demonstrate the depth and breadth of the discussions that took place during the DRIVE conference. The audience’s perspectives, questions, and insights enriched the conference proceedings and highlighted the complexities and challenges associated with understanding and addressing social exclusion and radicalisation.

The themes that emerged from these discussions, including conceptual and methodological considerations, navigating terminology and definitions, exploring the intersection of social exclusion and mental health, addressing the complexities of resilience and coping mechanisms, and navigating the research-policy nexus, underscore the need for ongoing dialogue, interdisciplinary collaboration, and reflexive practice in this field of study.

As the DRIVE project moves forward, these valuable contributions from the audience will undoubtedly shape future research directions, policy recommendations, and strategies for fostering social inclusion and preventing radicalisation. The conference served as a testament to the importance of engaging diverse perspectives and experiences in the pursuit of understanding and addressing the complex challenges faced by marginalized communities across Europe and beyond.

7. Moving forward

The DRIVE Project, a groundbreaking initiative funded by the European Union, recently hosted its major conference in Brussels, Belgium. The two-day event brought together a diverse audience from across Europe, including scholars, policymakers, practitioners, and community groups representing various disciplines such as the social sciences, humanities, and medical sciences. The conference aimed to foster meaningful exchanges and challenge conventional thinking about radicalisation, which often

overemphasises the role of ideology while neglecting the psychosocial, structural, and cultural factors that contribute to the marginalisation of individuals.

One of the key themes that emerged from the conference was the need to shift the narrative surrounding radicalisation. Many speakers argued that the current discourse tends to focus disproportionately on the ideological dimensions of radicalisation, such as extremist religious or political beliefs. While ideology undoubtedly plays a role, this narrow focus can obscure the deeper social, economic, and psychological factors that render individuals vulnerable to radicalisation in the first place. Several presentations highlighted the importance of addressing the structural inequalities and systemic barriers that contribute to the marginalisation of certain communities. Factors such as discrimination, and social exclusion can create a sense of alienation and disillusionment, making individuals more susceptible to extremist narratives that promise a sense of belonging and purpose. Moreover, the conference emphasised the need to recognise and appreciate the resilience and agency of those at the margins of society. Too often, marginalised individuals are portrayed as passive victims or potential threats, rather than as active agents with the capacity to resist and challenge extremist ideologies. By supporting and empowering these individuals and communities, we can help build resilience and counter the pull of radicalisation. Another key takeaway from the conference was the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration in addressing radicalisation. The multifaceted character of the phenomenon requires input from a wide range of disciplines, including psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, and more. By bringing together experts from diverse fields, the DRIVE Project Conference facilitated the sharing of knowledge and best practices, fostering a more holistic and nuanced understanding of radicalisation.

The DRIVE Project Major Conference in Brussels represented a significant step towards challenging conventional thinking about radicalisation and promoting a more nuanced and compassionate approach to the issue. By recognising the factors that contribute to marginalisation and vulnerability, and by empowering and supporting those at the margins of society, we can build more inclusive and resilient communities that are better equipped to resist the lure of extremism. The insights and recommendations that emerged from the conference will undoubtedly shape future research, policy, and practice in the field of radicalisation prevention and counter-extremism efforts across Europe and beyond.

UNVEILING THE INTERPLAY OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND RADICALISATION IN NORTH- WESTERN EUROPE

THE DRIVE PROJECT MAJOR CONFERENCE



**Universiteit
Leiden**
The Netherlands



**UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE**



AARHUS UNIVERSITY



UiO : University of Oslo



**UMEÅ
UNIVERSITY**



connectfutures
Creating Change Together



**UNIVERSITY OF
LIVERPOOL**

FRYSHUSET

Conference Venue: Stanhope Hotel Brussels Rue du Commerce / Handelsstraat 9,
1000, Brussels

Conference Dates: 11–12 June 2024



DRIVE project has received its funding from the European Union's H2020 Research and Innovation Actions programme under grant agreement No. 959200 - www.driveproject.eu

Dear participants

This conference concludes our 42-month investigation into the complex dynamics of social exclusion and radicalisation in the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom. We are delighted to host leading scholars, policymakers, practitioners, and community groups as they critically examine the multifaceted drivers of extremism and develop evidence-based strategies for building resilient, inclusive societies. Our ultimate goal has been to establish a platform for exchanging cutting-edge research, field-tested practices, and innovative policy visions. We are confident that our conference will not only provide an opportunity to learn more about the DRIVE project findings and the implications of social exclusion on radicalisation, but also to network with our speakers, who are distinguished scholars and practitioners in their fields.

This booklet will provide you with more information about the event schedule as well as practicalities for the conference at the Stanhope Hotel. We are dedicated to making this event unforgettable, highlighting the outstanding efforts of all project participants.

The DRIVE Project

Rationale for the conference

The DRIVE Project, a groundbreaking initiative funded by the European Commission and coordinated by Leiden University in The Hague, is pleased to announce an international conference unveiling its 42-month investigation into the complex interplay between social exclusion and radicalisation across four European countries. This conference brings together leading scholars, policymakers, practitioners, and community groups to critically examine the multifaceted drivers of extremism and chart evidence-based strategies for building resilient, inclusive societies. In an era of heightened polarisation and emerging threats, understanding the root causes of radicalisation is more crucial than ever. The DRIVE Project offers nuanced insights into how experiences of marginalisation and alienation can fuel susceptibility to extremist ideologies. By situating radicalisation within broader societal dynamics, this conference challenges prevailing assumptions and illuminates the urgent need for holistic, interdisciplinary approaches. Attendees will gain cutting-edge knowledge on the intersections of social exclusion, identity, belonging, and pathways to extremism.



Target audience

This conference welcomes a diverse assembly of 100–120 attendees, sharing the data analysis and knowledge that we have gathered across the course of the project and fostering dynamic dialogue with interested stakeholders from a range of key sectors, including:

- Academics specialising in radicalisation, extremism, social exclusion, conflict studies, and related fields.
- Policymakers involved in shaping prevention and integration strategies at local, national, and European levels.
- European-level police officers involved in CT-P/CVE.
- Practitioners engaging on the frontlines of counter-radicalisation, including social workers, educators, and community leaders.
- Civil society organisations, charities, and community groups challenging extremism and advocating for social inclusion and resilience strategies to combat radicalisation.

Whether you are an established expert, an engaged community stakeholder, or an emerging campaigner, this conference offers an unparalleled opportunity to exchange state-of-the-art research, field-tested practices, and innovative policy visions. Please join us in debate and discussion oriented towards leveraging collective wisdom to confront one of the defining challenges of our time.

DRIVE



Outcomes and outputs

Catalysing knowledge into action, this conference aims to:

- Disseminate the groundbreaking findings of the DRIVE Project, unveiling fresh evidence on the understudied linkages between social exclusion and radicalisation across the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and the UK.
- Advance conceptual and theoretical frontiers by interrogating the interplay of ideological, political, and socioeconomic factors in shaping radicalisation processes.
- Bridge disciplinary silos and fortify emerging best practices through interactive workshops, plenaries, and informal networking.
- Permit the airing of marginalised voices and engage impacted communities as vital partners in co-creating context-sensitive, empowering solutions.
- Equip policymakers with robust, research-backed recommendations for crafting proactive inclusion agendas that mitigate vulnerability to extremist narratives.
- Forge enduring networks of inspiration and collaboration that will serve as springboards for future research, practice, and advocacy.
- Stimulate public discourse and media engagement to shift dominant narratives around radicalisation, dispel misconceptions, and galvanise popular support for transformative social change.

This conference represents a clarion call to action, mobilising knowledge as a catalyst for building a Europe where all can thrive with dignity – a Europe that is steadfastly and actively resilient in the face of polarising forces. Together, we can rewrite the script on radicalisation, making social inclusion the cornerstone of sustainable security. Your voice and involvement are essential in this vital endeavour.



CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

11 JUNE – DAY 1

Unravelling the Nexus

1300–1330 – Registration

1330–1400 – Welcome

Opening remarks and housekeeping – Inés Bolaños Somoano, Leiden University

The DRIVE Project journey: advances, challenges, and opportunities – Tahir Abbas, Leiden University

1400–1500 – Keynote Speech: Introduction to Radicalisation and Social Exclusion

Chair – Mark Sedgwick, Aarhus University

Speaker – Alison Scott–Bauman, SOAS, London

1500–1530 – Coffee break

1530–1730 – Panel 1: DRIVE Findings by Country

Moderator – Associate Professor Nadia Fadil, KU Leuven

The Netherlands: Tahir Abbas, Leiden University; Denmark: Mark Sedgwick, Aarhus University; United Kingdom: Eolene Boyd–MacMillan, University of Cambridge and Gabe Mythen, University of Liverpool, and Norway: Valerie DeMarinis, Oslo University, Umeå University, and Innlandet Hospital Trust

1730–1830 – Reception at the Stanhope Hotel



12 JUNE – DAY 2

Bridging Research and Policy

0900–0915 – Late Registration

0915–1030 – Panel 2: Public Mental Health Consequences of Social Exclusion

Speakers: Valerie DeMarinis (Oslo University, Umeå University, and Innlandet Hospital Trust) and Eolene Boyd–MacMillan (University of Cambridge)

1030–1100 – Coffee break

1100–1230 – Panel 3: Findings on Far Right and Nationalist Groups

Moderator – Kaunert, Christian, Dublin City University Speakers – Mark Sedgwick and Gabe Mythen

Respondents – Joel Busher (Coventry University) and Lynn Schneider (ICCT, Netherlands).

1230–1330 – Lunch

1330–1500 – Panel 4: Findings on Muslim Communities and Government Relations

Moderator – Richard McNeil–Willson, University of Edinburgh

Speakers – Tahir Abbas and Valerie DeMarinis

Respondents: Amna Kaleen (University of Sheffield) and Paul Thomas (University of Huddersfield)

1500–1530 – Coffee break

1530–1630 – Panel 5: Translating Research into Policy Impact

Opening remarks – Cátia Moreira de Carvalho, Leiden University

Roundtable discussion with all DRIVE Principal Investigators and Alberto Contaretti (Radicalisation Awareness Network), Christian Kaunert (Dublin City University, Ireland), Nadia Fadil (KU Leuven), and Joana de Deus Pereira (RUSI Europe)

1630–1645 – Closing Statement: Tahir Abbas, Leiden University



The DRIVE project has received its funding from the European Union's H2020 Research and Innovation Actions programme under grant agreement No. 959200 - www.driveproject.eu

Biographies of speakers, moderators, and panellists

Abbas, Tahir	Professor of Radicalisation Studies, Leiden University and Honorary Professor, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter
Bolaños Somoano, Inés	Post-doctoral research fellow, Leiden University
Boyd-MacMillan, Eolene	Senior Research Associate, University of Cambridge
Busher, Joel	Professor of Political Sociology, Coventry University
Contaretti, Alberto	Policy Support Project Manager, Radicalisation Awareness Network
de Deus Pereira, Joana	Senior Research Fellow, RUSI Europe
DeMarinis, Valerie	Senior Professor in Public Mental Health at the Department of Public Health and Clinical Medicine at Umeå University, Sweden; Professor of Public Mental Health Promotion at Innlandet Hospital Trust, Norway
Fadil, Nadia	Associate Professor in Anthropology at the Interculturalism, Migration and Minorities Research Centre at Catholic University of Leuven
Kaleem, Amna	Leverhulme Early Career Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Sheffield
Kaunert, Christian	Professor of International Security at Dublin City University
McNeil-Willson, Richard	Alwaleed Fellow, University of Edinburgh
Moreira de Carvalho, Cátia	Post-doctoral research fellow, Leiden University
Mythen, Gabe	Professor of Criminology, Sociology, Social Policy, and Criminology, University of Liverpool
Scott-Bauman, Alison	Professor of Society and Belief in the Centre of Islamic Studies in the Near and Middle East Department at SOAS, London
Schneider, Lynn	Research Fellow, Preventing / Countering Violent Extremism, ICCT, Netherlands
Sedgwick, Mark	Professor of Arab and Islamic Studies, Aarhus University
Thomas, Paul	Professor of Youth and Policy and Associate Dean, University of Huddersfield



Conference Venue

The venue chosen for the conference is the [Stanhope Hotel](#). Situated in between the European quarter and the Royal Palace, this five–star hotel is guaranteed to provide you with an enjoyable experience for the duration of the conference.

The Stanhope Hotel's address is Rue du Commerce 9, 1000 Bruxelles. The conference will be held in the Balmoral Room. Coffee breaks and lunch will be served in the Bar Area.



Nearby Metro–stations:

Maelbeek, Arts–Loi, or Trône

Depending on the method of transportation you are using to travel to Brussels, various options will be outlined in order to ensure you are able to get to the hotel with ease. We strongly recommend taking the metro lines, which can be easily accessed and can bring you within 5 minutes walking distance from the hotel.

Alternatively, taxis can be found outside all major train stations, as well as at the front of Brussels– Airport. Below, several options will be outlined in order to provide you with an easy route to nearby metro stops.

Upon arrival at the Stanhope Hotel

Once you arrive at the venue, you may proceed to the reception desk, where staff will be available to register participants and provide you with further instructions on how to get to your room. Registration for the DRIVE conference will be available between 1300 and 1330 on 11 June, and late registration on 12 June is possible between 0900 and 0915.



The DRIVE project has received its funding from the European Union's H2020 Research and Innovation Actions programme under grant agreement No. 959200 - www.driveproject.eu

Travelling to the venue

From Brussels Airport

If you are flying to Brussels airport, the most convenient option to travel to the city centre will be via train to 'Schumann', situated in the European Quarters. The train station at Brussels airport is located underground, beneath the arrivals and departure halls.

Here, you can take a direct train to 'Schumann', which on average takes 25 minutes. From Schumann, you can transfer to the metro along lines 1 ("Gare de l'Ouest") or 5 ("Erasme") until the stop "Arts-Loi." From here, you could either walk directly to the Stanhope Hotel, which takes 15 minutes, or transfer to line 2 'Simonis', or line 6 'Roi Baudoin', and ride the metro for one stop till 'Trone'. This stop puts you within a 5-minute walking distance from the hotel.

From Central Station

If you are taking the train to either Brussels-North, Brussels-South, or the Central station, taking the metro till 'Arts-Loi' will put you within walking distance from the hotel, where you may transfer to line 2 'Simonis' or 6 and ride the metro for one stop till 'Trone'.

From Brussels-North Station

From Brussels-North, you may take either metro 3 'Churchill' or 4 'Stalle', for one stop until 'Rogier'. From here, you can transfer to lines 2 'Simonis' or 6 'Roi Baudoin', which will take you directly to 'Trone'.

From Brussels-South Station

From Brussels-South, the metro station 'Gare du Midi' is located underneath the main hall of the train station itself. From here, you may take either line 2 or 6, both in the direction of 'Elisabeth', until 'Trone'.

From the central station, you may take the metro along lines 1 ('Stokkel') or 5 ('Herrmann-Debroux'), which will take you to 'Arts-Loi'. From here, you could either walk directly to the hotel, which takes 15 minutes, or transfer to line 2 'Simonis', or line 6 'Roi Baudoin', and ride the metro for one stop till 'Trone'. This stop puts you within a 5-minute walking distance from the hotel.

From Brussels-Schuman Station

For those of you who might be staying at the Thon Hotel EU, you can arrive to the Stanhope hotel taking the metro 'Brussels-Schuman' until 'Trone', and then you are within 5 minutes walking distance.

