DRIVE
Resisting Radicalisation Through Inclusion

Public Report:
Case Study Areas

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Project information

DRIVE project information

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Introduction

The DRIVE project is an EU-funded Research and Innovations Action project aimed at determining the role of social exclusion on the radicalisation of groups defined as Islamist or far right in the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom.[1] This research and development project aims to determine multi-level understandings of radicalisation placed on questions relating to identity, the local lived experience, the changing nature of generations within contexts, and the wider concerns of political polarisation leading to cumulative forms of anti-democratic sentiment and action.

This case study area report for the DRIVE project is designed to provide a capsule overview of the sites of study for fieldwork to be undertaken across the four countries in which interviews, surveys, focus groups and observations will take place. In each of the four countries, two study sites are identified. These study sites will be supplemented in each country with non-geographically fixed online fieldwork.

In the report, we provide a brief rationale for the selection of the chosen sites in each country, alongside relevant contextual, historical and socio-economic data. Each section is narrated by the lead investigator in each country, supported by research teams, as appropriate. This report is to be considered in tandem with cognate deliverables on the DRIVE project. It acts as a reflection point on current perspectives on the siting of fieldwork within the four partner countries.

The United Kingdom: London and Manchester

1. Site rationale

There are available statistics that are instructive in establishing a sense of the magnitude and scale of the terrorist threat in the UK. A total of 92 deaths were recorded in the UK as a direct result of terrorist attacks between April 2003 and March 2019 (Allen and Kirk-Wade 2020). Since 9/11, there have been 4,452 terrorism-related arrests, with an average of 270 arrests per year over the last 6 years, peaking at 443 in 2017-2018 (ibid.). Drilling into this raw data, the role of demographics becomes of additional interest. Focusing on gender and age, the largest majority arrested since 9/11 have been male (4,038; 91%), with 52% of all arrests being made among those under the age of 30 (Allen and Kirk-Wade 2020). Concerning ethnicity, it is reported that 40% of arrests made were made against those of British South Asian descent, 31% Black or Black British, 12% White and 17% Other or unknown (ibid.). Of the 1,193 individuals subsequently legally charged with terrorism-related offences between 2001 and 2019, 1,023 (86%) were proceeded against and 1,023 were convicted (ibid.).

For the UK team working on the DRIVE project, attention will be focussed on two cities that have both been palpably impacted by religiously and politically motivated violence, namely London and Manchester. As well as being sites within which individuals and local communities have witnessed the infrastructural and human consequences of terrorist attacks, these cities have historically been marked by salient cleavages manifested along racial, ethnic, political and religious lines. The fieldwork conducted with young people, parents, community leaders and practitioner experts in Manchester and London will enable us to build up a rich picture of the significance of identity and belonging - understood both physically and remotely - in creating a sense of meaning and purpose for individuals and communities living in these two major urban areas. More specifically, we intend to explore the (dis)articulations between identity politics and (perceived and actual) social injustices to examine the extent to which these factors either encourage or are conducive to extremism. We will also explore examples of protective factors and preventative measures that have been deployed to reduce the risk of extremism that may lead to endorsement or enaction of organised violence.

2. Historical Context

Since a prolonged period of economic stagnation triggered by the global financial crisis of 2008, unemployment, depressed wages and state austerity cuts have produced harsh impacts on many individuals and communities across the UK (Hudson 2021; Jessop 2018). The wide-ranging economic and welfare consequences of the financial crisis have manifested most severely in areas previously impacted by poverty, a lack of institutional infrastructure and

problems of social exclusion. In some regions already adversely affected by economic decline, the Covid-19 pandemic has compounded matters, generating an especially 'wicked problem' (King 2021). In addition to producing macro-level political instabilities, the protracted period of the economic crisis has brought to the fore tensions about further privatisation, deindustrialisation, access to welfare provision and citizenship rights within communities. In some locales, these tensions have intertwined with political and religious polarisation and the propagation of values and beliefs that draw clear distinctions between those considered 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. Examples in the UK have involved individuals and groups promoting 'Islamist ideologies' that seek to promote the creation of an 'Islamic caliphate', on the one hand, and, conversely, far right ideologies that problematise Muslims and Islam and advance white nationalist perspectives, on the other. The increasing vocality and visibility of far right organisations over the last two decades can be connected to anxieties about perceived preferential treatment received by minority groups within indigenous white-English/British populations and the normalisation of disdain and prejudice against Muslim communities in the context of widening economic and political divisions (Abbas 2020).

Given that Manchester and London have both recently experienced clashes between far right sympathisers and demonstrators protesting against extreme-right politics, as well as gatherings organised by Islamists, these cities are apt locations for exploring extremism generally and, more specifically, the phenomenon of reciprocal radicalisation. Importantly, as discussed below, Manchester and London are cities that have historically been adversely affected by terrorist attacks, emanating from a variety of sources. In response to these attacks - and wider tensions between different ethnic, religious and political communities - local authorities and agencies in both urban centres have invested in developing platforms, structures and policies to tackle the problem of extremism, particularly as it has contemporarily manifested in far right and Islamist forms.

3. Socio-economic profile

Manchester

Both London and Manchester are major global cities, having historically been prominent drivers of wealth, focal sites of political struggle and centres of cultural advancement. The two cities have relatively diverse ethnic populations as a result of patterns of mass migration. They are also notable sites of religious plurality in the UK. This can be evidenced by official socio-economic statistics. Greater Manchester is a metropole that consists of ten boroughs (Bolton, Bury, Oldham, Rochdale, Stockport, Tameside, Trafford, Wigan) including two cities (Manchester and Salford). As of 2020, Greater Manchester has an estimated population of 2,835,686 making it the third most populated urban area after Greater London and the West Midlands (ONS 2020). Greater Manchester is home to a diverse multicultural population. The

City of Manchester has the highest proportion of non-white people of any district in Greater Manchester, with the following ethnic composition according to data from the 2011 census: White (66.7%); Asian (17.1%); Black (8.6%); Mixed race (4.7%); Arab (1.9%) and those of other ethnicities (1.2%). Comparatively, Wigan has the least ethnically diverse population: White (97.3%); Mixed race (0.8%); Asian (1.1%); Black (0.5%) and Arab and other ethnicity (0.2%) (ONS 2011).

Figure 1. Geographical distribution of Manchester's largest ethnic minority groups by ward 2011 (Jivrav 2013).

Concerning religion, Greater Manchester consists of those identifying as Christian (61.79%); No Religion (20.77%); Muslim (8.68%); and Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Sikh and Other (<1% respectively) (ibid.). While the percentage of Muslims in the Metropolitan borough of Oldham is the highest (17.7% [39,879] of 237,110), the highest number of Muslims by overall population reside in the City of Manchester (15.8% [79,496] of 547,627). Greater Manchester also has the largest Jewish population in Britain outside of London (ibid. and see below).

Crime in Greater Manchester was 2% higher in 2016 than it was in 2015, according to official police recorded crime data. The area was the site of around 334,000 recorded crimes in 2018. Of all the Greater Manchester boroughs, Manchester has the highest incidence of crime, followed by Rochdale and Oldham. Trafford has the lowest incidence of crime in Greater Manchester (ONS 2021).

Manchester has the largest travel-to-work area of any conurbation in the UK outside of London, with 7 million people living within one hour's drive of the city centre.

- Around 13.1% of people aged 16-64 in Greater Manchester and employment or are self-employed, fractionally below the UK average of 13.8%.

- The gross median annual wage for full-time workers living in Greater Manchester is £25,500, compared to a UK national figure of £27,600 (NOMIS 2016)

The unemployment rate in Greater Manchester is 7.3% (98,300) in the 12 months up to March 2015 - a decrease of 14.5% of the count (16,700) over the same period a year earlier and above the UK average of 6%. 620, 000 people live below the poverty line in Manchester (Greater Manchester Poverty Monitor, 2020) with the greatest incidence of child poverty being found in the City of Manchester (ibid.).

London

Greater London makes up the majority population of the London region and is organised into 33 local government districts - 32 London boroughs and the City of London itself. As of 2020, Greater London has an estimated population of 8,961,989, the largest urban population in the UK (ONS 2020). Greater London is an ethnically diverse area with 59.79% of the population classifying their ethnic group as White; 'Other White' (12.65%; mostly Greek-Cypriot, Italian, Polish, Spanish, Colombians and Portuguese); Asian (18.49%); Black (13.32%); Mixed race (4.96%); and other ethnicities (3.44%) (ONS 2011). The London Borough of Newham has the highest proportion of non-white people in any district in Greater London, with individual statistics according to the 2011 census as follows: Asian (43.5%); White (29%); Black (19.6%); Mixed race (4.5%) and those of other ethnicities (3.5%). Comparatively, Havering has the highest proportion of White citizens (87.7%); Asian (4.9%); Black (4.8%); Mixed race (2.1%) and other ethnicity (0.6%). Greater London is also a religiously diverse milieu with many faiths being practised in the capital. The ONS (2011) data recorded the religious composition of Greater London as follows: Christian (48.4%); no religion (20.7%), Muslim (12.4%), Hindu (5%), Jewish (1.8%), Sikh (1.5%), Buddhist (1.0%) and other (0.6%) (ibid.). The London Borough of Tower Hamlets is an example of an ethnically mixed area, with no ethnic group forming a majority population with 45% identifying as White and 41% Asian (ONS 2011). Tower Hamlets is also home to the highest population of Muslims in Greater London (34.5%). Comparatively, Havering has the lowest percentage of Muslims in Greater London (2%).

Figure 2. London Boroughs with a majority of BAME residents in 2011 (based on ONS 2011)

In relation to crime, recorded statistics suggest considerable variation between boroughs in the capital.

Figure 3. Recorded criminal offences between 2010 & 2021 (Metropolitan Police n.d.)

Legend:

	> 600,000
	300,000 to 600,000 offences
	200,000 to 300,000 offences
	< 200,000 offences

● Westminster is the borough where the most crimes were recorded between 2010 and 2021 (644,418 offences).

● Kingston upon Thames is the borough where the least crimes were recorded between 2010 and 2021 (121,329 offences).

● Harrow & Bexley were the two boroughs with the lowest crime rate (616 and 618 per

1,000 pop - the average crime rate in London is 973 per 1,000 pop). Westminster is the borough with the highest crime rate (2,554 per 1,000 pop).

In relation to racist hate crime, Westminster has the highest recorded incidence.

Figure 4. Racist and religious recorded hate crimes between 2010 and 2021 (ibid.)

Legend:

	> 10,000 offences
	5,000 to 10,000 offences
	4,000 to 5,000 offences
	< 4,000 offences

Westminster is the borough where the most religious and racist hate crimes were recorded between 2010 and 2021 (11,035 offences). Richmond upon Thames is the borough where the least religious & racist hate crimes were recorded between 2010 and 2021 (1966 offences). When referring to Islamophobic recorded hate crimes specifically, Westminster and Tower Hamlets are the boroughs where the most Islamophobic hate crimes were recorded between 2010 and 2021 (790 and 633 offences respectively). Bexley is the borough where the least Islamophobic hate crimes were recorded between 2010 and 2021 (65 offences). In relation to antisemitic recorded hate crimes the situation diverges.

Figure 5. Antisemitic hate crimes between 2010 & 2021 (ibid.)

● Barnet & Hackney are the boroughs where the most antisemitic hate crimes were recorded between 2010 and 2021 (respectively 1,153 and 862 offences).

● Bexley is the borough where the least antisemitic hate crimes were recorded between 2010 and 2021 (8 offences).

In terms of socio-economic factors, the picture is very mixed, with both economically prosperous and deprived wards being visible on the following map:

Figure 6. Poverty indicators in 2020 by boroughs (Trust for London 2020)

Tower Hamlets (39%), Newham (37%), Hackney (36%), Haringey (34%), Islington (34%) and Brent (33%) are all above the average poverty rate. Richmond upon Thames and Bromley (15%), Sutton, Bexley and the City of London (16%), Havering (17%), Kingston upon Thames (18%) are all under the average poverty rate.

4. Evidence of extremism

Incidents such as 9/11 and 7/7 have become longstanding focal points of reference, both for those attracted to and involved with Islamist and also far right extremism. It is clear that histories of colonialism and recent transnational terrorist attacks feed into and fuel both the actions of those conducting terrorist attacks and the ideologies espoused by extremist organisations in the UK. While those sympathising with Islamist ideologies point to the injustices of centuries of Western imperialism in Muslim countries, the deleterious human consequences of military operations resulting from the war on terror, and the widespread securitisation and surveillance of Muslims in the UK after the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, far right groups suggest that Islamist acts of terrorism are indicative of the inherent violence of Islam as a religion and the 'dangerousness' of Muslims in general (Winlow, Hall, and Treadwell 2017; Ahmad and Monaghan 2019). Ultimately, for both far right and Islamist groups, a philosophy that distinguishes between entitled 'in' and excluded 'out' groups is foundational to perceived grievances, identity politics and processes of exclusion.

4.1 Islamist

As regards Islamism and Islamist terrorism in the UK, the underpinning ideological narrative centres around the rejection of formal democracy and the glorification of actions of international Islamist extremist groups such as ISIL (Home Office 2015). The most recent iteration of CONTEST emphasises Islamist extremism on Salafi-Jihadi movements and politico-religious motivations that are inherently violent. To this end, the Islamist group al-Muhajiroun seeks to incorporate Britain into a global **Islamic Caliphate** ruled by Shariah law. In terms of the prevailing ideology, both extremist Islamist and far right organisations rely on notions of the inferiority and dangerousness of 'out' groups and the entitlement and superiority of the 'in' group.

4.2 The far right

Conceptualisations equating Muslims and Islam with terrorism and extremism have accelerated during a period of resurgence for extreme far right organisations in the UK. Several Far right groups such as Britain First (BF), the English Defence League (EDL) and National Action (NA) have promoted ideals that variously endorse and glorify racism, ultra-nationalism, neo-Nazism and Islamophobia (Griffith-Dickson, Dickson, and Ivermee 2014/2015). Such

organisations often seek to blame political, social and economic problems on 'others', creating scapegoats who are deemed threatening towards the disintegration of the cultural and national unity of 'in' groups (Allen 2011). In the UK, far right organisations have sought to attract attention by taking direct action and disseminating materials that promote nationalist and, latterly, anti-Muslim sentiments. One example of this is Britain First, who in the aftermath of the murder of British soldier Lee Rigby in 2013, declared its intention to place Islamist preacher Anjem Choudary under citizen's arrest, claiming that he was responsible for the radicalisation of Rigby's killers, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale (Turner-Graham 2019).

5. Instances of religious and politically motivated violence

5.1 Islamist

In the UK, the Islamist inspired terrorism threat became a domestic reality following the London terrorist bombings of 7th July 2005 (7/7). The UK's most lethal terrorist incident since the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, 7/7 served to create anxiety amongst members of the public, led to intensified state surveillance of Muslim minority groups and extensive development of intelligence and counter-terrorism measures. Some of the most recent instances of domestic terrorism are the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing, which resulted in 22 deaths and more than 800 people being wounded; the 2017 Westminster Bridge attack, which resulted in 4 deaths and 40 injuries; the 2017 London Bridge attack resulting in 8 deaths and 48 people being injured and the 2019 Fishmonger's Hall stabbings, which resulted in 3 deaths and 3 people being wounded.

5.2. Far right

Some members of extreme Far right organisations have cited attacks such as 9/11 and 7/7 as a reason for choosing to commit violent acts of retribution. Zack Davies, a member of National Action - a group that follows a contemporary version of Nazi ideology - was convicted in June 2015 for attempting to decapitate Dr Sarandev Bhambra, a Sikh British citizen. When questioned, Davies claimed he attacked Dr Bhambra because he was Asian (Whelan 2015). The incitement and glorification of violence by those influenced by extremist narratives was also further evidenced in 2016 when the Labour politician Jo Cox was murdered by Thomas Mair, who had a history of mental illness. Mair's political views aligned with those of the English Defence League (EDL) and had become intensified at the time by the upcoming Brexit EU referendum (Cobain, Parveen, and Taylor 2016). In the same year, concerns regarding the promotion and encouragement of terrorism following the death of Jo Cox, led to the aforementioned National Action becoming the first extreme Far right organisation to be proscribed in the UK (Home Office 2016). The following year, having acquired Far right publications from the EDL and Britain First (BF), in what became known as the Finsbury Park

Mosque attack, Darren Osbourne drove a van into pedestrians, killing Makram Ali and injuring nine other people.

6. Community relations and tensions

Aside from being religiously and ethnically diverse, the histories of the two cities - London and Manchester - are marked by various conflicts between different groups along multiple fissures of stratification: including class, gender, race and religion, as illustrated in the data cited above. Both conurbations have recently witnessed urban unrest and have experienced problems of crime control. Both London and Manchester are sites where longstanding tensions between the police and particularly ethnic minority communities have solidified.

The rise of ethnic nationalism in the UK, coupled with the consolidation of majority national identity politics in the UK cannot be fully understood without reference to Brexit. A portmanteau of 'British exit', Brexit refers to the withdrawal of the UK from the EU - formally the European Community [EC] - of which Britain had been a member state since 1973. As a result of the second referendum on continued EU membership in 2016, 51.9% (approximately 17.4m) voted to leave the EU, with the transition period coming into force on 31 January 2020. Since the outcome of the vote, political and media discourses in the UK have become increasingly polarised between those that elected to leave the EU and those that wished to remain. In terms of Right-wing politics, there has been ideational mingling and alliances forged between Conservative voters, those supportive of UKIP and individuals aligning with Far right groups such as Britain First.

Voting statistics show regional variations in the Brexit vote, with support for the now-defunct United Kingdom Independence Party which spearheaded the Brexit movement, varying significantly across various regions in the UK. It is important also to note the differences between boroughs in major UK cities, such as Manchester and London. In London, although the vote to remain in the European Union was generally strong, the leave vote achieved a majority in East London predominantly working-class neighbourhoods of Barking and Dagenham and Bexley, in addition to several neighbouring areas in the Thames estuary. All of these areas were traditional Labour Party strongholds that witnessed swings to a UKIP majority in the general election.

In Manchester, although the city achieved the strongest remain vote in the North West region, the majority of districts in the area voted to leave the European Union. While in Greater Manchester itself, Manchester (60.4%) Trafford (57.7%) and Stockport (52.3%) voted to remain, Wigan, Tameside and Oldham voted to leave with majority votes of 63.9%, 61.1% and 60.9% respectively. As in London, in the most socio-economically deprived areas, most voters chose to exit rather than to remain in the European Union. In many respects, Brexit both

crystallised the ambitions of the Far right and acted as a catalyst for attracting new sympathisers. Projecting the view that external agents were undermining the majority of the people and increasingly controlling 'their country', far right groups used Brexit to leverage their claims of superiority, vehemently vocalising their resentment towards immigrants and 'minorities' (Abbas 2020). As a reflection of the growing polarisation of politics in the UK, the impacts of Brexit have been profound and continue to resonate.

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Norway: Oslo and Kristiansand

1. Site Rationale

The two sites of study for the Norwegian DRIVE team are Oslo and Kristiansand. Oslo is the capital city of Norway. With a population in the city approaching 700,000 the wider metropolitan area is host to a population that exceeds a million. Oslo is also the hub for Norway's governmental, banking and finance sectors. Kristiansand - with a population of 90,000 - is the largest city in Southern Norway. It is an area sometimes referred to colloquially as the 'Bible belt' due to the city being seen as a stronghold for conservative Evangelical Christianity. The city has comparatively strong support for the conservative branch of the Christian Democratic Party (KrF), a high level of religious activity and a low degree of endorsement of gender equality.

According to a 2014 report from Statistics Norway, 15% of Kristiansand's population originate from an immigrant background. Of this 15%, 69% are immigrants from Africa and Asia. Those of immigrant backgrounds living in Kristiansand tend to reside in specific areas, such as Slettheia (31%), Grim-Møllevann-Dalane, Kvadraturen-Eg and Hånes-Timenes (between 14% and 17%). Norwegians of African and Asian immigrant backgrounds are four times more likely to be unemployed or receiving welfare in comparison with the Kristiansand population as a whole (Fisher-Høyrem and Herbert 2019, 5).

In recent years, Far right organisations such as The Nordic Resistance Movement and the anti-Islamist SIAN have staged demonstrations in Kristiansand. During rallies and demonstrations, some supporters of SIAN have burned the Quran in heavily Muslim-populated areas of Kristiansand to provoke the local Muslim community and gain media attention.

In a recent study, Fisher-Høyrem and Herbert (2019) offer an account of how Muslim youth in Kristiansand experience a sense of being marginalised and framed negatively by the media. As a coping strategy, some young people have used social media to create safe spaces and facilitate in-group bonding. For DRIVE it would be of interest to explore further how the young, Muslim experience of marginalisation and how far right rallies in the locale impact self-identity, community cohesion and propensity toward extremism.

2. Historical context

At present, around five per cent of the Norwegian population have their familial origins in a country with a Muslim majority population. Among them, Pakistani-Norwegians and Somali-Norwegians form the largest groups (van Es 2021). Norway has become a multi-ethnic society

and the proportion of foreign-born individuals residing in Norway today is broadly comparable to countries such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Reisel et al. 2019).

Multiple developments and changes in the past decade have impacted on both the actors and sites selected to study in Norway and these have, in turn, influenced the research methodologies to be deployed during the DRIVE project. First, and most importantly, the far right extremist youth cultures that were active during the 2000s are contemporarily largely absent from major cities. The racist killing of 15-year-old Benjamin Hermansen in 2001 by two men affiliating with neo-Nazism led to increased public focus on racism and anti-racist campaigns and, ultimately, the fading prevalence and visibility of racist youth subcultures, at least in streets and communities. The experience in Norway during the 1990s and early 2000s was such that violent confrontations between neo-Nazi extremists and anti-racists could have radicalising impacts on both sides and may potentially cause the escalation of violence. However, this form of spiralling inter-group violent conflict dynamics appears to have been relatively absent during the last 15 years.

3. Socio-economic profile

Norway has a high employment rate of (78%) relative to other European countries (van der Wel et al. 2014). Salaries and pensions have increased steadily for the past 40 years (ibid.). While Norway has the lowest income inequality in the world, inequalities in earnings and wages have grown in recent decades with a widening income gap (ibid.). Although Norway is renowned for having a compressed wage structure, more than half of the wealth accrues to the 10 per cent on the top of the income distribution (ibid.). In this regard, the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) report *Poverty and living conditions in Norway in 2017* shows a worrying trend. According to the EU poverty line - those who earn less than 60 per cent of the median income - the proportion of poor people in Norway has risen from 7.7 per cent to 9.3 per cent four years later (NAV 2017, 3). Those in the 18-34 age group are statistically the most vulnerable group, with 14 per cent of this age group being considered 'poor' (ibid., 3). Around 17.5 per cent of all children in Oslo live in households that are classified as 'low income' (NAV 2017, 22).

Norwegians of immigrant background, although comprising only 16.8 per cent of the population, account for 28.5 per cent of all people considered to live in sustained low income (NAV 2017, 3) Forty per cent of immigrants from Africa and Asia living in Norway fell into low-income categories in 2017, as defined by the EU. Unemployment is 3.5 times higher among Norwegians of immigrant background, in particular from Africa (10,6 %) and Asia (6,8 %) (ibid., 20). In the 15-29 age bracket - which accounts for most Norwegian-born second-generation immigrants - the unemployment rate was recorded at 6 per cent, almost three times

higher than that of their Norwegian born peers (2.2 %).

Norwegians of immigrant backgrounds from Africa and Asia rank highest among welfare recipients. They experience financial struggles related to housing and spend a high proportion of their low income on rent or housing debt (Omholt 2019). Although income inequality and deprivation among Norwegian families are ranked as the lowest in Europe, the capital city of Oslo is characterised by significant differences in income across and within city districts. A study based on the data from the Survey on Living Conditions EU-SILC (2015), shows that a significant number of immigrant families in Norway have low incomes, basic levels of education, a weak attachment to the labour market and are in receipt of welfare assistance (With and Thorsen 2018).

4. Evidence of extremism

In the Norwegian context, there are different types of radical nationalism represented by a variety of parties, movements, organisations and milieus. Since the concept and term 'right-wing extremism' is controversial and heavily stigmatised, very few political, parties, groups or activists use it to self identify or to describe their own position.

According to a threat report by The Norwegian Security Police (2021), Islamist extremism and right-wing extremism represent the greatest terrorist threats to Norwegian society, with a chance that one or more extremists affiliating with these ideologies will carry out a terror attack in Norway in 2021. The threat posed by Islamist extremists is thought to be higher in the coming year due to increased tension between freedom of speech and utterances that many Muslims feel represent a desecration of Islam. Radicalisation in relation to far right extremism is also expected to be more widespread in the near future, with online platforms being central sites for extremist beliefs to be propagated and shared (ibid).

4.1 Islamist

The Prophet's Ummah is an extreme Islamist organisation based in Norway. Founded in 2012, its stated aim is to follow and represent Islam in its 'pures't form. The group declares its full *baraa* (rejection) from all forms of *kufr* (disbelief) and has declared hostility to all who oppose Allah, Islam and Prophet Muhammad. Advocating an intense hatred for Western non-Muslim values, the group legitimizes the use of violence in the name of Islam. In February 2015, a 22-year old Norwegian-Pakistani man returned to Norway after having been engaged in combat in Syria. Having participated in military actions and other serious acts of violence against 'infidels' he was the first Norwegian citizen to be charged under Penal Code section 147 d:93. According to the Police Security Services, the radicalisation processes began as a direct result of his contact with key members of the Prophet's Umma organisation (Engebrethsen 2015).

lslam Net is a Norwegian Muslim organisation founded by Fahad Qureshi in 2008. It has grown to become the largest Muslim youth organisation in Norway with around 2000 members. A large number of members of the organisation have joined in the course of active missionary activities, 'revival meetings' and networking through social media. Islam Net self-identifies as a messenger of the prophet and aims at solving any misunderstandings about Islam as a religion to build bridges between Muslims and non-believers. The organisation is the largest and most active Salafi group in Norway. Despite Islam Net's perception of itself as a moderate Islamic organisation, it has been criticised and accused of being reactionary and conservative in line with it's stated ambition of imposing strict Sharia in Norway. The organisation has been referred to by Lars Gule, a scholar of Islam, as an 'undemocratic, misogynist organisation with extreme objectives and values' (Engebrethsen 2015).

4.2 Far Right

The most notable racial nationalist organisations in Norway include the militant Nordic Resistance Movement (DNM). Formed by neo-Nazi nationalists in Sweden in 1997, DNM is a transnational organisation with official chapters in Sweden, Finland and Norway. In Norway, DNM demonstrations have drawn around 50 to 70 participants with the majority of activists being Swedish nationals that have crossed the border to Norway (Klungtveit 2020). Characterised by militant activism, the organisation has some 30-40 activists in Norway, an estimated 400-500 in Sweden and around 100 in Finland and Denmark. The militant activists of DNM refer to themselves as 'white nationalists' or 'National Socialists'. DMM identifies Jews and non-white people (including Muslims) as the enemies of a pure Nordic nation (ibid.). Their violent and militant outlook means that DNM activists are few in number and highly stigmatised in wider society. However, members of this pan-Scandinavian organisation are adults, typically between the age of 20 and 50, and at least in Norway, with low levels of involvement amongst teenagers and/or young adults. The group's rigid organisational structure involving clear hierarchies and rules does not seem to have wide appeal amongst young people. However, it is noteworthy that the 21-year white supremacist terrorist Philip Manshaus had a meeting with a DNM leader and sought membership of the organisation before committing fatal violence (ibid.).

While the right extremist youth cultures that were active during the 2000s have largely migrated from physical streets to digital environments, street activism has not receded completely, with some far right neo-Nazi and anti-Islam organisations mobilising in the streets - such as the neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement and the anti-Islam organisation SIAN. Nevertheless, recent empirical developments indicate that reciprocal radicalisation occurs, although involving new actors and fresh dynamics. In the past year, activists from the anti-Muslim organisation SIAN have staged multiple anti-Islam rallies in the capital Oslo (31th August 2020), in Drammen (10th April 2020) and Bærum (24th April 2020), the two latter cities are suburbs of Oslo. Heavily guarded by police authorities protecting their freedom to

demonstrate, the SIAN activists disseminated material intended to produce anti-Islam hostility. Older anti-Islamist activists have engaged in a politics of provocation, ripping pages from the Quran and spreading hatred that has led to violent clashes with counter-protesters, including anti-racist activists and Norwegian of Muslim minority background. The SIAN rallies have been defended by Prime Minister Erna Solberg as protecting freedom of speech. At one demonstration police arrested 29 people, several out of whom were minors and of minority background (VG 2020).

5. Instances of religiously and politically motivated violence

5.1 Islamist

In Norway, research into militant Islamism in Europe and Scandinavia has been conducted by Thomas Hegghmmer and Petter Nesser at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). Their research involves investigating topics such as radicalisation and local activists' links to global Jihadist networks and foreign fighters. According to The Norwegian Police Security Service (Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste [PST]), about 100 people with links to Norway have travelled to Syria as foreign fighters, joining ISIL, the Al-Nusra Front and similar groups. PST cannot quantify the number of foreign fighters who have travelled to other conflict areas to join extremist Islamic groups, but this number is marginal compared with those who have joined groups in Syria/Iraq. (Christensen and Bjørgo 2017, 7). OnSeptember 21, 2013, al-Shabaab militants stormed Westgate shopping mall Nairobi, Kenya, in a four-day siege resulting in the deaths of 67 people. One of the suspected terrorists was 23-year-old Hassan Abdi Dhuhulow from Norway who had moved to Somalia in 2009 (Engebrethsen 2015). For some of these returning foreign fighters, there could be a risk of planning and implementing attacks in Europe (ibid.). There is a clear need for obtaining more knowledge about what motivates people from Norway to become foreign fighters in Syria, Iraq, Somalia and other countries affected by civil war and conflict.

5.2 Far right

In March 2019, the Brevik-inspired Christchurch terrorist murdered 51 people during Friday prayers at the Al Noor Mosque and the Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, the deadliest mass shooting in the history of New Zealand. The live-streamed mass murder served as an inspiration and a blueprint for others terrorists in the US, Germany and Norway who would imitate the violence based on the examples carried out in New Zealand and popularised in digital subcultures. A day before the Muslim celebration of Eid al-Adha, on 18 August 2019, the Norwegian Philip Manshaus first shot and killed his stepsister (who was adopted from China) before driving to the Al-Noor Islamic Center in Bærum, Norway. His stated intention was to kill 'as many Muslims as possible' In a post on the day of the terrorist attack, Manshaus shared a meme on *Endchan* where he situated his actions in the context of previous attacks

against Muslims.

Anti-Muslim hostility is also prominent in the counter-Jihad movement where Islam and Muslims have emerged as objects of fear, aversion and hostility. These were the ideas that inspired Anders Behring Breivik to commit a serious terrorist attack on 22 July 2011, when he killed seventy-seven people, mostly teenagers at a Labour Party Youth Camp at Utoya. In targeting young future social democratic leaders he considered to be part of an internal cultural Marxist elite, Brevik's actions were designed to elicit the downfall of Europe´s purportedly multiculturalist elites, thus removing an obstacle to his plans for a wider ethno-religious cleansing of Muslims from Europe (Bangstad 2014).

6. Community relations and tensions

Negative attitudes towards Norwegian Muslims are widespread. In particular, the anti-immigration populist Progress Party has captured a segment of the population's fears and insecurities about the impact of immigration-generated ethnic and religious diversity on identity. FrP, that took part in the government coalition led by the Conservative Party from 2013 to 2020, routinely emphasising that immigrants, in particular those of Muslim background, posed a threat to national identity, welfare and ways of life anchored in Christian values and heritage. According to the current leader of FRP, Sylvi Listhaug, the increased number of Muslims in Western societies, including Norway, is one of the key reasons why Christian values are under pressure.

Although far right anti-Muslim discourse has been propagated by the Progress Party it cannot be understood as fully separated from the public mainstream, where Islamophobic discourses have been mainstreamed and normalised. Beyond electoral politics as a matrix for support in the population for populist nationalism, studies over the past decade suggest that Norwegians feel threatened by migration and are suspicious of or hostile towards ethnic 'out groups', in particular Muslims. Anti-Muslim hostility is a well-documented phenomenon. A study commissioned by the Conservative government suggests that Norwegians show prejudice towards Muslims and that negative stereotypes of Muslims are widespread (Hoffman and Moe 2017).

The actual and/or perceived discrimination can also lead to the greater distance between Muslim minority groups and the majority population. The greater the fear of Islam, the greater the demand that minorities assimilate, the greater the perceived islamophobia, the greater the separation of minorities and the greater the fear of them (Kunst et al. 2015, 257). Thus for Norwegian Muslims who have both been subjected to Islamophobic prejudice and violent extremism can potentially lead to a greater perceived distance between the minority group and majority population. Olav Elgvin suggests that the key reasons that some Norwegian Muslims

have radicalised are a sense of being under attack, that they are being viewed by suspicion in the media and that they feel a sense of not belonging (Elgvin cited in Engebretsen 2015). The experience of 'conditional belonging' (Aarset 2018) of having to make extraordinary efforts to be recognised as equal citizens is also a driver for recruitment. In an interview with the Norwegian National Broadcaster (NRK) Yousef Assidiq explained why he joined a radical milieu. He felt misrepresented in a society with critical and negative attitudes towards Islam and a lack of belonging. Thus, in a radical Islamist milieu, he found a brotherhood that provided a sense of belonging and security, a sense of finding a 'new home' (Engebrethsen 2015).

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Denmark: Copenhagen and Aarhus

1. Site rationale

The two cities selected for study are Copenhagen and Aarhus, because these two cities together

hold the majority of Denmark's Muslim population. Nationalist (or "far right") radicalisation is not concentrated in particular cities, and will be located primarily through social media. It is not anticipated that any one city will be more strongly represented than any other, but it is expected that some nationalist extremists will be in Copenhagen and Aarhus.

2. Historical context

Immigration to Denmark from outside Europe started in 1967 but was at first relatively limited, and immigrants were well and generously received]. Immigration grew after 1983, when a new law facilitated immigration and numbers of arrivals to the country grew, as did hostility to immigration (Wren 2001). The first attack on an asylum centre took place in 1985. The rise of the Danish People's Party has transformed politics, and although the Danish People's Party does focus also on other issues, notably internationalisation and globalised elites, immigration and Islam top its agenda, and thus remain at the top of the national political and media agenda. It is important that, for Denmark, immigration from outside Europe is a relatively recent issue. While some European countries experienced large waves of migration and ethnic diversity since the 1950s, mainland Denmark has experienced significant ethnic diversity only more recently.

The Danish state, on the other hand, has long experience with ethnic diversity, since the Danish *rigsfællesskab* (commonwealth of the realm) still includes Greenland and the Faroe Islands, and previously included Iceland (until 1944), the US Virgin Islands (until 1917), parts of northern Germany (until 1864), the whole of Norway (until 1814), southern Sweden (until 1658), and most of England (until 1042). Modern Denmark is in fact the remaining core of a once large multi-ethnic empire. A minority of Danes regret Denmark's history of imperialism, especially in Greenland and in relation to participation in the slave trade (slavery in what were then the Danish West Indies was not abolished until 1848), but this understanding is not widespread, and most Danes focus instead on the ethnic homogeneity of mainland Denmark subsequent to the loss of most of the German minority after the Second Schleswig War in 1864. This left a substantial Danish minority under German control, and the subsequent recovery (in 1920) of some of the territories concerned is still celebrated.

The most significant crisis in post-war Danish history, at least in terms of significance for minority-majority of relations, has been the 'Cartoon Crisis', commonly known in Danish as 'the Mohammed cartoons'. This crisis did not so much affect the self-perception of the majority population, as the perception of Muslims among sections of the majority population (Agius 2013; Carle 2006; Henkel 2010; Sløk 2009) Public and political analysis of the crisis in Denmark has paid far more attention to what it might say about Muslims than what it might say about non-Muslim Danes. The Cartoon Crisis can be understood as an example of reciprocal radicalisation in terms of producing a concatenation effect, as follows: (1) what was

understood as Muslim challenges to freedom of expression provoked some members of the majority population leading to the publication of the cartoons, which (2) provoked some Muslims who reacted to this provocation, which (3) provoked members of the non-Muslim majority population, which (4) further antagonised Muslim communities.

3. Socio-economic profile

Statistics Denmark, the national statistical agency, does not use the phrase 'social exclusion', and its annual 'Survey on Living Conditions' focuses on poverty, and does not distinguish between majority and minority populations (Danmarks Statistik 2021). The national statistics agency does, however, also publish an annual report entitled 'Immigrants in Denmark' (Danmarks Statistik 2020) that covers both immigrants and second-generation migrants (known as *efterkommere* or descendants) which distinguishes between persons of Western and non-Western origin. This report covers demographics, employment, education, finances, welfare and criminality. It explicitly identifies minority-majority issues, indicating, for example, that the percentage of persons aged 30 to 59 with incomes in the lowest quintile is 53 per cent for non-Western immigrants as against 15 per cent of persons of Danish origin. While only 2 per cent of pupils of Danish origin have the lowest possible grade-average in primary school (under 2), 10 per cent of second-generation females and 15 per cent of second-generation males fall into this category. Such statistics make the degree of minority social exclusion very clear.

4. Evidence of extremism

To what extent there is evidence of extremism in Copenhagen and Aarhus depends very much on definitions.

4.1 Islamist

Among the places and neighbourhoods where Muslim radicalisation has occurred are those that have been identified by the Danish state as "especially vulnerable public housing areas" (henceforth, EVPH areas) and, especially, as "hard" EVPH areas, meaning that the have been on the EVPH area list for four years. As of 1 December 2020, there were 13 "hard" EVPH areas, three in or near Copenhagen, two in Aarhus, and eight elsewhere in Denmark (Kühle and Lindekilde 2010). It should be remembered, however, that radicalisation - as defined by the police in Aarhus - is also found outside these areas. Recent work in this area (Kühle 2020) reports increasing difficulty in accessing Salafi milieus but identified two to three Salafi mosques in Aarhus, only one of which was named. The Salafi milieus that may be of interest in terms of research sites in Copenhagen are less well known to researchers.

Certain mosques and Islamic organisations are considered 'extreme' or 'extremist', but this classification needs to be sensitively investigated and tested. Some organisations and sites are prominent mostly because of media coverage or because individuals charged with terror-related offences were known to have attended.

4.2 Far right

Nationalist extremism is evidenced by demonstrations, protests, and provocations. The clearest evidence is provided by voting figures from the most recent election, which was contested by two extremist parties:

1. New Right (Nye Borgelige). Founded in 2015 by two former members of the Conservative People's Party (founded 1916), and won 2.4 per cent of votes in 2019, and 4 seats in parliament. More extreme than the Danish People's Party on Islam, and to its right on economics. Calls for expulsion of certain Muslims from Denmark.
2. Hard Line (Stram Kurs). Founded in 2017 by Rasmus Paludan, and won 1.8 percent of votes in 2019, but no seats. Calls for the deportation of all Muslims.

Votes for these parties, which together won 4.1 percent of the national vote in 2019, came mostly from former voters for the Danish People's Party (Kosiara-Pedersen 2020) and electoral figures show that they were especially strong in Southern Jutland. They achieved their best result in the small and prosperous village of Øster Lindet in Southern Jutland, where 128 of 479 votes were cast for nationalist parties, divided approximately equally between the centre and extreme parties.

5. Instances of religious and politically motivated violence

Denmark has suffered relatively little religious and politically motivated violence. The total death toll since 2001 is three, all resulting from a single incident in 2015 involving a recently-released Muslim prisoner.

5.1 Islamist

The single incident of Islamist violence in Denmark in recent years was in 2015 and caused three deaths, including that of a Muslim gunman, who was shot dead by the police. There have also been a number of trials of Muslims charged with planning violence and other terrorism-related offences. In addition, PET (the Danish Security and Intelligence Service) estimated in 2018 that about 150 people had travelled to Syria from Denmark (PET Center for Terroranalyse 2018). Some of these were then involved in combat and other forms of violence, though not in

Denmark.

5.2 Far right

Far right or nationalist violence in Denmark consists of hate crimes directed against persons who appear to be Muslim. Statistics on hate crimes are produced by the police, based on crimes reported, and by the Ministry of Justice, based on surveys among victims. The Ministry of Justice reports that in the period 2008 to 2019, 15 percent of the victims of violence thought that the attack definitely or possibly had a racist or religious motivation (Boesen Pedersen, Kyvsgaard, and Balvig 2020). Their report does not give figures by year, but the police figures (which are lower in total) show a steady increase in racist hate-crimes from about 150 in 2016 to over 300 in 2019, i.e. an increase of over 100 percent (Rigspolitiet 2020). This increase, however, also reflects an increased focus on reporting the hate element in violent crime. Figures for religiously motivated crime include Jews as well as Muslims, and in 2019, about one third of these attacks were reported by Danish Jews. The remainder were reported by Danish Muslims. Sometimes anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish hatred gets confused; there has been at least one case of a Lebanese Muslim visiting Denmark being verbally abused as a Jew.

6. Community relations and tensions

Radicalisation in Denmark is clearly reciprocal. Portrayals of Muslims in Denmark contribute to the, radicalisation of members of the majority population. Perceptions of the majority population, including those prevalent among Danish Muslim communities, contribute to the radicalisation of non-Muslim Danes.

One special case of radicalisation relates to freedom of expression. Actions carried out under the banner of defence of freedom of expression range from the well-known case of the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad commissioned by *Jyllands-Posten* to organised marches through the EVPH areas and public desecration of the Quran in Muslim-majority areas, most often by Rasmus Paludan, a well-known anti-Islam activist. Those who carry out such actions understand them as a response to Muslim attempts to restrict freedom of expression.

Many of Denmark's experiences of violent Muslim extremism have been in response to actions in defence of freedom of expression. In 2008, two Danish residents of Tunisian origin were expelled on suspicion of planning to kill Kurt Westergaard, one of the more prominent cartoonists. In 2010, a Danish resident of Somali origin was arrested outside Westergaard's house, armed with a knife and an axe. Several planned attacks on the offices of Jyllands-Posten have been intercepted, mostly outside Denmark. In 2013, a Dane of Lebanese origin attempted to murder Lars Hedegaard, a prominent anti-Muslim journalist. In 2015, a Dane of Palestinian origin attacked a meeting in Copenhagen that was hosting Lars Vilks, a Swedish artist who had

drawn some extra cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad that were considered offensive by many Danish Muslims. Most recently, in 2020, a Danish resident of Palestinian origin was arrested for approaching Rasmus Paludan while holding a kitchen knife.

It can be safely assumed that other Danish Muslims who were not sufficiently radicalised to pick up a knife were, despite this, also radicalised by actions carried out under the banner of defence of freedom of expression, and the whole phenomenon may therefore be understood as a form of reciprocal radicalisation.

Some research on Muslim radicalisation also notes the importance of mainstream anti-Islamic political discourse, which is itself a consequence of some form of nationalist radicalisation. A Muslim interlocutor working in counter-radicalisation told one researcher "every time I do something, some politician makes some strange comment whereby everything we have done, or the people working with integration and making these people become part of the community [is undermined]. My opinion on that is that you ruin all the effort then" (Dalgaard-Nielsen and Schack 2016).

There is also research that shows the impact of majority attitudes on identity, if not precisely on radicalisation. One researcher who interviewed 20 Danes of Middle-Eastern origin in Danish high schools and universities found a variety of positions on identity, ranging from those who were sure that they were Danish to those who were sure that they were not (Bakkær Simonsen 2017). All agreed, however, on three major boundaries that made it difficult for them to feel Danish: appearance, language, and Islam. One interviewee who belonged to a sports club where both Muslim and non-Muslim Danes did not drink alcohol had decided that it was possible to be Danish and Muslim, but the general feeling was that to be Danish one had to look and dress Danish, go to parties, and drink alcohol—and certainly not speak a foreign language in public. For some, especially some young women of Turkish origin, this was an option. For others, skin colour made it impossible. Many of these others talked of the way that members of the majority society looked at them (the majority "gaze"), of how they would be congratulated by strangers on speaking such good Danish (why should they not?), of how they would go to lengths to present themselves as "good immigrants", not the "criminal, radicalised troublemakers" that they thought most people suspected them of being (Bakkær Simonsen 2017). This is the Muslim equivalent of nationalist radicalisation that is fed not by inter-group violence but by inter-group perceptions. There are some people from the majority society who think that all Muslims are radical, and in the same way there are a few Danish Muslims who think that all people from the majority society are racist and Islamophobic.

The negative perceptions that members of the majority and minority communities have of each other may be fed by a form of social exclusion that has received little attention: the absence of cross-community social contacts. Many members of the majority White Danish community do

not know Muslims well, and many Danish Muslims do not know any members of the majority community well. As has been noted, it is often said that the typical nationalist voter has never actually met a Muslim.

One study in Aarhus found that EVPH areas with higher radicalisation were distinguished from EVPH areas with lower radicalisation by their degree of internal social cohesion, which implies an absence of cross-community social contacts with the wider city community (Hjelt 2020). In a nutshell, the more isolated, the more the risk of radicalisation. A survey of Danish Muslims (Goli and Rezaei 2011) found that 81 per cent of those who seemed radical had no close non-Muslim Danish friends, and the same was true of 39 per cent of all Danish Muslims who did not seem radical. While the adequacy of the operationalisation of 'radical' and 'radicalisation' in this context is questionable, the overall results point to an absence of cross-community social contacts, and suggest that this may be associated with radicalisation.

Economic globalisation has also had an indirect impact on non-Muslim Danes, nationally and thus also regionally, since it is one of the causes of modifications that have been made to the Danish welfare system in recent years. Although these modifications are widely considered to have been successful, and the Danish model of "flexicurity" (which combines flexibility in the labour market with security for the individual) is highly regarded by many commentators, modifications in the welfare system have contributed to perceptions among non-Muslim Danes that the welfare system is under strain. Some worry that immigration is putting unsustainable financial strains on the welfare system; others worry that a welfare system like Denmark's depends on solidarity, and solidarity is threatened by immigration. Both perceptions have contributed to "welfare chauvinism". It is, of course, true that people of immigrant background pay relatively less in taxes and draw relatively more in welfare but this is not the only reason for modifications to the welfare system, which has also responded to economic globalisation and other factors.

In geographical terms, then, Copenhagen and Aarhus contain examples both of good and poor inter-community relations, of tensions and the absence of tensions. Tensions can be expected to be found in the designated "hard" EVPH areas, and there is certainly exclusion and radicalisation among Muslims in such areas, and so at least one such area in Copenhagen and another such area in Aarhus should be included in our research. Given that we know from existing research that Muslim radicalisation is also found outside these areas, however, it would be a mistake to restrict ourselves to "hard" EVPH areas. Concentrations of Muslims can also be found in certain educational institutions, for example in programs in dental hygiene, and an approach based around educational locations would therefore complement an approach based around residential locations. An approach proceeding from virtual spaces will complement both these other approaches.

We do not expect to find nationalist radicalisation in the EVPH areas. The best proxy for nationalist radicalisation, voting for the two extremist parties that stood in the last election, in fact points away from Copenhagen and Aarhus towards certain provincial areas. Our research should therefore cover these areas, while not excluding Copenhagen and Aarhus. Given that existing research does not point to any particular geographical areas, the most important approach to nationalist radicalisation will be that proceeding from virtual spaces.

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The Netherlands: Amsterdam and The Hague

1. Site rationale

With a migration history similar to that of neighbouring Western European economies attempting to reconstitute their societies in the post-war period, there are similar challenges facing minority and disadvantaged groups who have faced the pressures of social and economic inequality in the light of post-industrial restructuring. As a result, there are pockets of concentrated disadvantage that can be characterised by particular ethnic and religious cleavages. The importance of underscoring the nature of inequalities in society helps to determine particular localities within the Netherlands that face various social and political tensions as a result of economic and cultural disconnect. In this regard, the cities of Amsterdam and The Hague have emerged as home to a significant majority of the country's approximate 1-in 8 minority groups with migration heritage. Because of historical issues of migration and settlement within these localities, with ongoing issues of disadvantage and discrimination, younger generations remain concentrated within the same locality. It is from these concentrated localities that in recent periods the Netherlands has witnessed the emergence of young individuals with radicalised views founded in the ideological abstraction of religious concepts and principles. Since the 'war on terror', with instances of Islamist extremism, there have also been cases of far right extremism and radicalisation which have become more noticeable increase in periods, arguably for the same sets of localised reasons concerning their identity and belonging coupled with a lack of economic opportunity and political disconnect with an increasingly out of touch centre. This section of the report focuses on some of the historical come on economic and social issues concerning parts of the cities of Amsterdam and The Hague and how they have been exacerbated by political polarisation and the wider securitisation of Muslim minority groups since the events of 9/11. It rationalises the case made to carry out the DRIVE fieldwork in concentrated localities within these two cities as discussed below.

2. Historical context

The social geography of the twentieth century Amsterdam is shaped primarily by three factors: demographic growth, gentrification and increasing ethnic diversity. Through the decolonisation process, in which the Kingdom of the Netherlands was constituted by the Netherlands, Suriname and the Dutch Antilles, large parts of Suriname's population migrated to the Netherlands. Through the suburbanisation of both Amsterdam and the Hague, inner city areas became increasingly less-well-off as middle classes moved to suburban homes with the possibility to live in their own houses. This led to the inner cities of both Amsterdam and the Hague to become the home of those who could not afford to the suburbs, with a high

concentration of migrants in some inner-city quarters.

The A10 ring road which separates the pre- and post-war urban fabric of Amsterdam remains a key dividing line between the rapidly gentrifying and affluent inner city and the outskirts, it is in a way both a physical and a mental dividing line in the minds of many inhabitants. Most recent policy proposals have sought to "upgrade" these areas in particular, starting from the zones directly adjacent to the A10 (Savini et al. 2016, 107). Most suburbs in Amsterdam remain still relatively white, however, an increasingly economically empowered middle class of highly educated people from people with migration history reshapes the satellite towns as well, e.g. 30% of Almere's residents are non-white (ibid., 108). A study by Fenneke Wekker demonstrates that rather than a simple increase of diversity that would blur boundaries between different ethnic and racialised groups, increasing diversity in an Amsterdam working class neighbourhood reinscribed and strengthened boundaries between groups along the lines of ethnicity, race and class (Wekker 2019).

One of the upshots of the connection between marginalisation in the labour market, lack of economic opportunities and spatial concentration of people from non-Western backgrounds in deprived neighbourhoods has contributed to widespread attitudes of xenophobia, racism and Islamophobia. The process of "integration", as it is often called, has become a contentious political issue, in which anti-foreign and racist sentiments are widespread; a tendency that the 2021 election of more far right members of parliament than ever clearly demonstrates. 57% of the population believes that acceptance of immigrants from Third World Countries was the biggest mistake of the Netherlands in its post-war history, and 56% consider Islam to be a significant threat to Dutch identity (Nell and Rath 2010, 16).

3. Socio-economic profile

Spatial disparities have led to a very particular pattern of socio-economic distribution: "Socially, The Hague is arguably the most segregated city in the Netherlands (Kloosterman and Priemus 2001). In 2012, 49.5% of the population was of Dutch origin, 34.6% were non-Western immigrants and 15.9% were Western immigrants. Over the last few years migration from Eastern European countries, in particular, has accelerated, the migrants seeking employment predominantly in the greenhouse horticulture area just to the southwest of The Hague (called 'the Westland')" (Meijers et al. 2014). In 2014, of a total population of 16.8 million people, 3.6 million (21.4 %) were considered "allochthonous" (i.e., coming from elsewhere), 2 million of which are "non-Western" (12%) and 1.6 million (9.%) Western (CBS 2014, 26).

At the beginning of 2021, the CBS (the Central Bureau for Statics) reported that 24.7 per cent of the Dutch population had a migrant background. This group is roughly divided between people with a Western migration background and people with a non-Western migration background. These statistics include people who were born abroad (first generation) and those people who were born in the Netherlands to at least one parent with a migration background (second generation). Most people with a non-Western migration background live in one of the main urban agglomerates. In Amsterdam and The Hague, the percentage of people with a migration background is 55.6 per cent (CBS 2021).

4. Evidence of extremism

In terms of extremist movements associated with the Islamic realm of belonging, security services in the Netherlands have particularly focussed on Salafism (AIVD 2015, 5). Although the services distinguish between political, apolitical and jihadi Salafist movements, the internal differentiations have been glanced over. In reality, the use of the term has been employed as a 'catch-all term', in which Salafism as a whole is seen as a risk to democratic peace and order. We can detect a pattern in which Salafism in the Netherlands has become more prevalent in face of the rise of right-wing populism and extreme-right actions. Just like Islamist extremism, right-wing extremism is composed of different streams of thought, fragmented in ideology and organisation. The AIVD (2018, 4) broadly refers to right-wing extremism as a political ideology characterised by the opposition to democracy, incorporating biological or cultural racism, anti-Semitism and anti-Islamism. Extreme-right movements, in turn, have partially mobilised around anti-Islamic issues. Both forms of extremism, in all their different manifestations, are thereby intimately connected, albeit both spheres extend beyond their perceived antithesis. Moreover, whereas open access monitoring reports on extreme Islamist activities are limited, the activities and prominence of different extreme-right movements are recorded for every police region in the Netherlands (which data mostly focusses on offline activity).

4.1 Islamist

The government-led search for extremist Islamist 'hotspots' in the Netherlands have for long been connected to certain mosques in larger cities, including the El-Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam and the As-Soennah mosque in The Hague. Both mosques, founded in 1986 and 1990 respectively, were established with the financial aid of the Saudi non-governmental organisation al-Haramain and have been identified as core knots in Dutch Salafist networks (Koning de 2019, 82-83). From 2010 onwards, some of the mosque's followers turned their back to As-Soennah and started organising their own meetings, for example, through the activist structures of *Team Free Saddik/Behind Bars, Straat Dawah* and *Sharia4Holland* (Bergema and San 2019, 639). The fact that most of these structures arose in the period 2010-

2012, is likely to be co-influenced by Mark Rutte's first cabinet, which was a minority government that relied on parliamentary support from the PVV to achieve a slim majority. The PVV openly opposed the presence of Islam in the Netherlands, describing Islam as a non-native ideology. The mainstreaming of the PVV is likely to have unsettled many and might have caused a sense of marginalisation and isolation amongst religious and ethnic minorities. Bergema and San (2019, 643-44) demonstrate how the establishment of activist networks in the greater The Hague area eventually enabled a large group of Dutch foreign fighters to travel to Syria and later Iraq. The majority of The Hague associated groups left in the early stages of the Syrian conflict, at the end of 2012 and at the beginning of 2013 (Ibid., 650). Amsterdam has been recognised as another hotspot from which Dutch foreign fighters left for Syria and Iraq (Ibid., 644). In 2018, it was reported how the El-Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam had given shelter and guidance to various Muslims upon their approaching departure to the Islamic State.

4.2 Far right

The Verwey-Jonker Institute develops a report every two years on racism, antisemitism and extreme-right violence in the Netherlands. These writings reveal that the activities of certain groups in certain localities are typically driven by a small number of activists in a concentrated space (Wagenaar 2020, 68). In Amsterdam, Rechts Verzet (Right Resistance) and in The Hague, Identitair Verzet (Identitarian Resistance) and Voorpost (Outpost) are particularly active. Apart from their local focus, organisations mainly operate in the Randstad and they occasionally mobilise in response to current affairs across the Netherlands. Many of the extreme-right activities are articulated in response to perceived 'non-Dutch' developments.

5. Evidence of political conflicts

The prognosis of Islamist extremist violence is partly based on the existence of international Salafi jihadist networks, national and local organisational structures as well as individual activities (Welten and Abbas 2021). In contrast, although the Netherlands has not witnessed a deadly attack from the extreme-right, the AIVD (2018, 19) does report on a few dozen violent incidents each year. Whilst the AIVD (2018, 16) describes extreme-right acts of violence as 'rare', its encouragement, legitimisation and glorification are not.

5.1 Islamist

To date, the most well-known 'terrorist' attack in the Netherlands is the 2004 murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh, who was shot and stabbed by Mohammed Bouyeri. Theo van Gogh had just produced the short film Submission, part 1, written by the Somali-born Dutch politician Ayaah Hirsi Ali (Schuurman 2018, 60-68). The film graphically critiqued the status of women in Islam but was perceived as provocative and polarising. Provoked by the film, the

26-year-old Dutch-Moroccan Bouyeri murdered Van Gogh, injured several bystanders, and pinned a note on Van Gogh's chest in which he threatened Hirsi Ali.

Following the assassination of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by the hands of Mohammed Bouyeri, who had infrequently attended the As-Soennah and the El-Tawheed mosque, various imams softened their tone. Whether they adjusted their speech due to disagreement with the assassination or to discourage further scrutiny, the result was that some of their younger followers felt disenfranchised (Fadil and Koning 2019, 59).

The most recent 'terrorist' attack in the Netherlands took place on 18 March 2019, when the 37-year-old, Turkish-born Gökmen Tanis killed four and injured six people in a tram in Utrecht. The assailant, who had a long track record of mental health problems (including struggles with addiction, aggressiveness and loneliness), was charged with four counts of murder with a terrorist motive. The life-sentence verdict that followed was partially based on the alleged hand-written note found in Tanis' car, which read: "I am doing this for my religion. You guys are killing Muslims and you want to take our religion away from us. You will not succeed in that. Allah is great" (NOS 2020).

5.2 Far Right

In 2017, Voorpost arranged a small demonstration in The Hague against the establishment of a new mosque (Tierolf, Drost, and van Kapel 2018, 37). In 2018, Identitair Vezet organised a protest in the Schilderswijk in The Hague, also against the foundation of a mosque (Wagenaar 2020, 39). Four years earlier, Geert Wilders had called for demonstrations in the neighbourhood, to communicate that that the Schilderwijk 'is also the Netherlands' (NOS 2014). In a response to this call, several extreme-right movements arranged 'marches for freedom', in which they protested against the perceived threat of religious fundamentalist laws and sympathisers of the Islamic State (Ibid.). On several occasions, protesters were met with counter-protesters. In June 2017, the As-Soennah mosque received a toy lorry in the post, with an accompanying letter that suggested that worshippers would risk being run over. The issuers of such threats are often difficult to trace (AIVD 2018, 15).

Nonetheless, when a decapitated doll was left outside an Amsterdam mosque in January 2018, the culprit was uncovered. He was the founder of Rechts Verzet (Ibid.). Although Identitair Verzet's roots are firmer in The Hague, they have also been active in Amsterdam. In 2017, for example, they occupied a recently opened Muslim secondary school (Tierolf, Drost, and van Kapel 2018, 36). That their protest is not only motivated by fear of religious violence but also Islamophobic and racist, which is indicated by the fact that they demonstrated in front of mosques, Islamic slaughterhouses and near the homes of asylum seekers. There are also recorded incidents in which mosques and gravestones on Islamic cemeteries were vandalised (Wagenaar 2020, 38-39, 56).

6. Community relations and tensions

The 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, the 2001 murder on politician Pim Fortuyn and the 2004 murder on filmmaker Theo van Gogh, impacted the perceived security situation in the Netherlands (Ibid., 11). Notions of insecurity and fear, previously connected to immigrant communities, were now transformed into debates on 'radical Islam' and the 'war on terror'. A post-9/11 opinion poll showed how more than 60 per cent of the Dutch population endorsed the expulsion of Dutch Muslims who voiced support for terrorist attacks and a similar percentage perceived terrorist attacks as a general hindrance to integration (Archick et al. 2011, 21). In 2005, a study by the Pew Research Center (2005, 1,3) showed that 32 per cent of Dutch people worried about Islamic extremism in the Netherlands and 46 per cent were concerned about Islamic extremism around the world. Moreover, 88 per cent of Dutch respondents saw Islam as particularly prone to violence (Ibid., 11-12).

Although the Dutch government officially presented the 'war on terror' as a war that would protect freedom and tolerance, inconsistent framing by politicians and the media led to a perceived war on Islam. Following the murder of Theo van Gogh, for example, the deputy prime minister Gerrit Zalm (VVD) declared 'war on Muslim extremists' (Parool 2004). The AIVD (2003, 27; 2004, 5) repeatedly warned that the consistent critiques on religious and ethnic minorities could feed processes of marginalisation, alienation and radicalisation.

the recent rise of right-wing populism across the globe has affected the radical-right and extreme-right landscape in the Netherlands, enhancing support bases and opportunity structures. The 2016 electoral triumph of President Trump resulted in optimism amongst a wide range of radical-right and extreme-right communities, partially mainstreaming some of the far right's core ideas about nativism, nationalism and xenophobia (of various kinds). The words of President Trump created the impression of urgency and legitimacy among right-wing ideological actors, with implications resonating far beyond American soil (Wagenaar 2020, 12). From 2016 onwards, the Netherlands saw greater support for various right-wing political parties and social movements, also amongst the formerly less represented, well-educated youth (NCTV 2018, 19). These support bases were translated into new, American-inspired groups, including Erkenbrand (founded in 2016) and the Proud Boys NLD (founded in 2018).

Erkenbrand calls itself alt-right and seeks to disseminate and normalise right-wing extremist ideas by casting them in a more 'intellectual' mould (Kranenberg 2017).[2] It organises lectures and conferences and publishes opinion pieces on its website. Participants in its meetings are expected to display a certain level of flair and intellect (AIVD 2018, 5; Wagenaar 2020, 30). Erkenbrand propagates 'The Great Replacement', which conspiracy theory talks about a conscious plan to destroy autochtoon, white Netherlands. The greatest threats are seen in the

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[2] See also: https://kafka.nl/erkenbrand-alt-right-in-nederland/?lang=en

establishment, the leftist corner and the media, who they accuse of facilitating a 'white genocide' (Wagenaar 2020, 15). Both Erkenbrand and Proud Boys NLD exhibit a strong aversion to feminism and homosexuality, along with strong anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic leanings. Whereas both Erkenbrand and Proud Boys NLD are American-inspired movements, the Flemish-aligned extreme-right movement Voorpost (founded in the 1970s) explicitly mobilises against the American influence on Dutch culture. To symbolise the anti-American stance, Voorpost frequently organises demonstrations in front of McDonalds franchises across the Netherlands. Voorpost's main priority is the unification of the Netherlands, Flanders and Northern France, a space for a homogenous Dutch people (Ibid., 62).

Finally, a key tension running through Dutch society is the difficulty to talk about racism. It seems that the continuous debate on the Zwarte Piet (Black Pete) indicates the much larger problem of critically discussing racism openly in the Netherlands. Because Dutch public discourse and self-understanding are strongly based on itself being a liberal, open and egalitarian society, criticisms of racism and racist stereotypes are frequently rejected, or even worse, instrumentalised by right-wing politicians as Dutch culture under threat. This makes work on how Islamophobia and racism severely constrains and conditions the possibilities of citizenship, striving and flourishing for racialised and religionised young people in the Netherlands particularly difficult. This also raises the question of to what extent the shift towards the right in electoral and party-political terms shapes the growth of the 'far right' spectrum and the dynamics contained within. The binary distinction between *allochtoonen* and *autochtoonen* seems to be a key context to bear in mind when talking about social exclusion and race in the Netherlands, which, albeit officially abandoned by the Netherlands, is vocabulary that is relevant for public discourse.

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